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Abstract 
 
Symbolic material objects such as art or certain artifacts (e.g., fine pottery, 
jewelry) share one common element: The combination of generating an 
expression, and the materialization of this expression in the object. This 
explains why people place a much greater value on handmade over machine-
made objects, and originals over duplicates. We show that this mechanism 
occurs when a material object¶V symbolic property is salient and when the 
creator (artist or craftsman) is perceived to have agency control over the one-
to-one materialized expression in the object. Co-activation of these two 
factors causes the object to be perceived as having high value because it is 
seen as the embodied representation RIWKHFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXHSHUVRQDO
expression. In six experiments, subjects rated objects in various object 
categories, which varied on the type of object property (symbolic, functional, 
aesthetic), the production procedure (handmade, machine-made, analog, 
digital) and the origin of the symbolic information (person or software). The 
studies showed that the proposed mechanism applies to symbolic, but not to 
functional or aesthetic material objects. Furthermore, they show that this 
specific form of symbolic object valuation could not be explained by various 
other related psychological theories (e.g., uniqueness, scarcity, physical 
touching, creative performance). Our research provides a universal framework 
that identifies a core mechanism for explaining judgments of value for one of 
our most uniquely human symbolic object category. 
 
Keywords: Object Valuation; Symbolism; Agency Control; Human Expression; 
Art and Artifact; Mind ± Body Relationship 
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The Mind in the Object - Psychological Valuation of Materialized Human 
Expression 
 
Most people place extra value on hand-made objects. Regardless of 
whether it is a sculpture, which the artist shapes with hands, or an artifact 
(e.g., ZLQHJODVVRULHQWDOUXJZDWFKµKDQG-PDGH¶LVRIWHQXVHGDs a central 
HOHPHQWIRUGHWHUPLQLQJWKHREMHFW¶VYDOXH<HWWKLVSUHIHUHQFHIRUDKDQG-
made object is puzzling, because it would not always have a positive 
LQIOXHQFHRQWKHDUWLIDFW¶VIXQFWLRQDOSHUIRUPDQFH,QGHHGEHFDXVHKDQG-
making inevitably creates physical and mechanical variance, hand-made 
objects are often inferior from a functional perspective. Machine-manufactured 
quartz watches, for example, are significantly more precise than the most 
expensive Swiss mechanical watches made by the hands of a skilled 
watchmaker in Geneva.  
This leaves us with the question, why do we impute more value on 
material objects when they are made by hand rather than manufactured by 
automated machinery? Our manuscript was motivated by this question, and it 
allowed us to identify a key element in material objects that elicits high 
valuation: The combination of generating an expression, and the 
materialization of this expression in the object. In other words, the crucial 
factor underlying high valuatioQLVWKHSHUFHSWLRQWKDWWKHFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXH
personal expression becomes embodied and directly materialized in the 
object.  
The psychological mechanism underlying this phenomenon of object 
valuation, which we tested in a series of six experimental studies, requires the 
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co-RFFXUUHQFHRIWZRNH\IDFWRUV7KHVDOLHQFHRIWKHREMHFW¶VV\PEROLF
object property, and (2) The perception of agency control over the FUHDWRU¶V
materialized expression.  
We believe that this allows us to explain a central mechanism that 
XQGHUOLHVWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOYDOXDWLRQRIVRPHRIKXPDQLW\¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQW
symbolic object categories: works of art and certain artifacts that contain a 
salient symbolic component (e.g., fine porcelain or jewelry). We will explain 
why attributes such DVµKDQG-PDGH¶, RUWKHIDFWWKDWWKHREMHFWLVµWKHRULJLQDO¶
and not a duplicate, have such a positive impact on the psychological 
valuation of these objects. Furthermore, we will discuss why previous theories 
in psychological object valuation (e.g., uniqueness, scarcity, performance and 
contagion) cannot sufficiently account for these phenomena.  
Our theoretical framework will be explained in the following sections 
below. 
Psychological Theories of Object Valuation 
It is well known that modern human beings have developed a very 
special relationship with material objects, and would assign very high value to 
some of them (e.g., Belk, Wallendorf, & Sherry, 1989). However, the 
psychological mechanism that underlies these valuation processes is still 
poorly understood.  
The concept of value is a core construct within both economics as well 
as psychology. However, an important difference between economic and 
psychological theories of value is that the former focuses on market value 
(i.e., value depends on how others value it) whereas the latter has been 
explained by the level of a hedonic experience that a certain stimulus elicits 
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(Higgins, 2006, 2007; Glimcher, 2010) as well as the intensity of the 
experienced attraction towards a particular target (Higgins, 2006). Yet, in 
order to examine the specific psychological mechanisms of material object 
valuation, we need to relate this perception of value to a priori specifiable 
object properties and specifiable mechanisms that are tied to how these 
objects are made (e.g., manual versus automatic processes).  
According to identity signaling research (Berger & Heath, 2007), every 
material object consists of two major properties: (1) functional performance 
property, which is the level of effectiveness in satisfying a particular utilitarian 
need (e.g., DNQLIH¶VIXQFWLRQRIVOLFLQJREMHFWVLQWRVHSDUDWHSLHFHVDQG
symbolic property, which is the ability of the stimulus to represent an 
important content (e.g., the Statue of Liberty as a symbol of freedom). An 
REMHFW¶VDHVWKHWLFDSSHDUDQFHFDQEHVXEVXPHGXQGHUWKHIXQFWLRQDOSURSHUW\ 
that is referring to the function of evoking a certain level of aesthetic appeal 
(i.e., its beauty), which in turn depends on how much it fulfills certain visual or 
other sensory properties (e.g., symmetry, figure-ground contrast; see Reber, 
Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004 for a discussion).  
Along the dimension of the functional performance property, 
psychological valuation is quite straightforward: any procedure (e.g., hand-
making, machine-making, software algorithms) should add value when it 
helps to improve the degree to which an object performs its function (e.g., a 
saw that cuts timber in 5 seconds instead of 30 seconds). Aesthetic object 
properties follow the same logic: the more visually fluent the object becomes 
as a result of the procedure, the higher its value will be (Reber et al., 2004). In 
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contrast, the valuation mechanism is less straightforward for symbolic object 
properties, and therefore requires further elaboration.  
Past research in psychology and semiotics has identified various 
mechanisms underlying symbolic object valuation. In its most basic form, a 
symbol achieves its value by association between a sign and its content, 
facilitating the recall of relevant memory (see Nöth, 1995; Kreuzbauer, 2002). 
For example, alphabetical letters are associated with specific sounds and their 
value derives from the fact that they can be combined into words to facilitate 
written communication. Some symbols would achieve their value because 
they are associated with a positively valued group (e.g., Berger & Heath, 
2007, 2008). For example, wearing a Christian Crucifix has value because it is 
associated with this particular religious group, and allows the person to signal 
identification with Christianity and its distinction from other religious groups. 
<HWIRUDOOWKHVHH[DPSOHVWKHV\PERO¶VYDOXHdoes not depend on the 
material object that it is made of, but on its ability to facilitate identification and 
distinction (see Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010). On the other hand, 
there are symbols whose value is inextricably bound to a particular material 
object. Examples would be a toy from RQH¶V FKLOGKRRG.HQQHG\¶VEULHIFDVH
the Black Stone of Mecca. For such symbolic objects, value derives from the 
direct association between the singular object and something of worth (Belk, 
1988; Belk et al., 1989; Bullot & Reber, 2013), because it allows human 
beings to recall some positively valued episodic memory, or because it was 
used in a relevant exchange relationship (e.g., gifts). Research has shown 
that valuation by association can be strongly affected by the idiosyncratic 
(historical or cultural) context (Bullot & Reber, 2013).  
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Importantly, however, there is a substantial difference between these 
symbolic objects of value and objects such as artwork or artifacts. Although it 
is possible to psychologically generate any kind of positively valued 
association with any arbitrary object, an artwork or symbolic artifact (beyond 
WKHDUWLIDFW¶VIXQFWLRQDOSURSHUW\was purposely made by its creator to express 
something, and this expression becomes materialized in the object (see 
Danto, 2013). So the relationship between making a unique personal 
expression and its one-to-one materialization in the object are the main 
valuation drivers for this specific category of symbolic material objects (i.e., art 
and symbolic artifacts).  
Human Agency and Control over the One-to-One Materialized 
Expression 
Symbolic expression (i.e., creating a symbolic object to communicate 
or express a particular content) is a good starting point for understanding 
higher valuations for art and artifacts. But by itself, it would not be sufficient to 
explain why an original artwork would attain a higher value than an identical 
duplicate, because both would contain the symbolic information that is 
UHSUHVHQWLQJWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQFor example, 3LFDVVR¶VGuernica 
allows viewers to recall memory contents about the artist, a certain artistic 
style, or the cruelties of the bombardment of this Northern Spanish city. But 
the activation of these particular memory contents could occur regardless of 
whether one is looking at the original, or when looking at a poster print. 
However, to have a more complete account that also explains why originals 
are more highly valued than duplicates, perceptions of the degree of human 
agency (Bandura, 2000, 2006; Malafouris, 2013) need to be included in the 
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framework. More specifically speaking, art objects or certain symbolic artifacts 
VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDVPDWHULDOµHQG-VWDWHPHQWV¶ (see Gell 1998; Goodman 
1976), representing a FUHDWRU¶VLH, the agent) embodied expression in the 
singular object. This process of materialization occurs in the very moment of 
creation and is crucial for such objects to HPERG\WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ 
Specifically, symbolic objects such as works of art represent symbolic 
meaning. However, they only become objects of value once the creator is 
perceived to have agency control over the process where this symbolic 
PHDQLQJZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVWKHFUHDWRU¶VLQWHQGHGH[SUHVVLRQEHFRPHVRQH-
to-one materialized in the singular object. Hence, the object becomes a form 
of isomorphic representation of the moment of creation (Gell, 1998). 
Different Forms of Producing Symbolic Material Objects 
This mechanism can best be explained by illustrating it in different 
procedures for the production of artwork or symbolic artifacts. Intuitively, one 
would expect the creator to lose agency control once an original is made by a 
machine, or duplicated. But such simple dichotomies are inconsistent and can 
be misleading (Grandy, 2007), because it is not always clear what constitutes 
as hand- or machine-made. Some creators (artists or craftsmen) might only 
draft some sketches or create prototypes and then use tools, machines or 
receive support from their assistants for the production of the final object.  
Our framework can solve these inconsistencies by putting them under 
one theoretical umbrella. For example, Soda Can, a marble sculpture made 
by the contemporary American artist Robin Antar, has the shape of an empty 
soda can. Let us assume that the intended meaning of Soda Can is to offer a 
specific critique on consumerism. Some people could find this to be an 
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important message, whereas others might consider it irrelevant. Yet, how 
important one considers the symbolic meaning of an art-object or a symbolic 
artifact is irrelevant for our psychological mechanism of valuation. What does 
matter is that the creator transforms this symbolic meaning into one particular 
symbolic µHQG-VWDWHPHQW¶WKURXJKDPDWHULDOREMHFW. In other words, once Soda 
Can has been carved out of marble block X, it embodies one particular 
moment of WKHFUHDWRU¶Vexpression (based on a particular message such as a 
critique on consumerism). Hence, one specific moment representing the 
FUHDWRU¶VSHUVRQDOH[SUHVVLRQ LVµVHWLQVWRQH¶(in marble block X) and any 
machine or other person that would now duplicate X into marble block Y 
would be merely copying DQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VPDWHULDOL]HGµHQG-VWDWHPHQW¶. 
Following our logic, because Y does not represent WKHFUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HG
expression (which is only materialized in X), it should significantly decrease in 
perceived value, even though looking at Y could activate the same memory 
content about consumerism. This finally explains why machine-made does not 
matter per se, but only when it affects the one-to-one materialization of the 
FUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ)RUH[DPSOHWKHUHZRXOGEHQRSUREOHPLIWKHDUWLVWKDG
created three different versions of Soda Can as clay models, which are then 
carved out of three different marble blocks with the help of other people or 
machines. This is, in fact, a common procedure when an artist or craftsman 
cannot complete the object alone (e.g., steel sculptures). However, if the artist 
would only produce one clay-version and a machine duplicates it onto three 
different marble blocks, the one-to-one materialization is violated because 
WKUHHREMHFWVZRXOGFRQWDLQWKHLGHQWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHFUHDWRU¶V
expression (which was embodied in the moment the clay-version was 
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created). Note that the one-to-one materialization is again ensured when the 
artist uses one single clay-version as a prototype from which she produces 
three different marble-versions by hand (e.g. like Rodin who had one 
prototype for The Thinker from which he hand-made several final sculptures). 
This is because then the prototype LVQRWWKHPDWHULDOL]HGµHQG-VWDWHPHQW¶EXW
merely provides an orientation for the three creator-PDGHµHQG-statements¶ 
which are materialized in the moment when she hand-shapes each of the 
three marble sculptures. We summarize these (common) procedures of 
symbolic object production in a more formalized way in Table 1.  
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
 
We believe that the deeper reason we value objects that (one-to-one) 
embody the FUHDWRU¶Vunique expression might be because they allow us to 
XWLOL]HZKDW+XPSKUH\KDVGHVFULEHGDV³DZD\WRORRNLQWRDQGUHDG
DQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VPLQG´+HJRHVRQWRDrgue that this would allow us to 
understand our own consciousness, as well as the general concept of 
consciousness. From an evolutionary perspective, Humphrey argues that the 
development of the ability to XQGHUVWDQGRWKHUV¶PLQGVZDVDFUXFLDOdriver 
that enabled humans to become the most socially skilled animal on Earth (p. 
745). A similar argument was recently made by Tomasello (2014a, 2014b) 
regarding the concept of shared intentionality. This would finally allow us to 
explain what makes art so special for our species. Functional or aesthetic 
objects achieve their value as a response to evolved adaptations that provide 
benefits for survival and procreation (e.g., a higher valuation for the more 
functional stone axe, or our preference of red and yellow over brown colors) 
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(see Reber et al., 2004). In comparison, symbolic objects derive their value 
through their function of facilitating human interaction (Henshilwood & 
Marean, 2003; Wadley, 2001; see also recent research on cooperation, 
strategic interaction and cultural evolution: Van Lange, Balliet, Parks, Van 
Vugt, 2013; Cheng, Tracy, Foulsham, Kingstone & Henrich, 2013; Henrich & 
McElreath, 2003), and art objects are perhaps our most uniquely human 
object category, because people feel they DOORZXVWRµORRN¶LQWRRWKHUKXPDQV¶
minds. But this requires the co-RFFXUUHQFHRIWKHREMHFW¶VV\PEROLFPHDQLQJ
with its materialization in the singular object (in order to connect the mind with 
the object).  
To sum up, our mechanism of valuation requires two components: a 
symbolic property (e.g., a motif) WRUHSUHVHQWDFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXHSHUVRQDO
expression, and its one-to-one materialization in the singular object (i.e., 
agency control over the embodiment of a certain instance of creation). In our 
view, these are the core characteristics that distinguish art objects and 
symbolic artifacts from other material objects. We also believe that it allows us 
WRXQGHUVWDQGDFRUHSV\FKRORJLFDOPHFKDQLVPIRUYDOXLQJKXPDQLW\¶VPRVt 
unique object category.  
Materialized Expression Versus Other Forms of µ+XPDQ-0DGH¶ 
Given the importance of objects such as art or certain artifacts during 
human evolution (Henshilwood & Marean, 2003; Wadley, 2001), one could 
ask if what we describe can be subsumed under something like a human-
PDGHHIIHFWRUDVSHFLDOIRUPRIKXPDQXQLTXHQHVV%XWDODEHO³KXPDQ-
PDGH´ZRXOGEHSUREOHPDWLFEHFDXVHE\GHILQLWLRQHYHU\SURGXFWRUDUWLIDFW
(even machine- or mass-manufactured ones) are made by humans, whereas 
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our mechanism only applies to a certain form of symbolic human-made 
material objects. Another intuitive explanation for our phenomenon would be 
the level of uniqueness. So an original or a hand-made object might just have 
higher value mainly because it is perceived as more unique. But such an 
explanation would be inconsistent with current theories of uniqueness and 
distinctiveness (e.g., Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Tian, Bearden, & Hunter, 
2001), which have their application in the context of group- and social 
identities (e.g., Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). For 
example, according to optimal distinctiveness theory (Leonardelli et.al., 2010), 
DSHUVRQZKRIHHOVWRRPXFKµFORVHQHVV¶EHFDXVHKHRUVKHLVVXUURXQGHGE\
a group of people who are all wearing red T-shirts would have an increased 
need for distinctiveness or uniqueness. But a hand-made red T-shirt which is 
visually indistinguishable from the other red machine-made T-shirts would not 
satisfy the goal of distinctiveness, regardless of whether the person signals it 
to the group or only to himself or herself. Regardless of how the T-shirt is 
PDGHRUZKHWKHULWFDUULHVWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ, a blue T-shirt would be a 
mucKPRUHHIIHFWLYHPHDQVIRUVDWLVI\LQJRQH¶VQHHGIRUXQLTXHQHVV
Alternatively, one could argue that uniqueness in this situation is seen as a 
form of scarcity (e.g., Verhallen, 1982; Verhallen & Robben, 1994; Lynn, 
1991), that is, a craftsman makes a handcrafted jewelry, which would be a 
one-of-a-kind object because no other object would look identical. Still, 
scarcity as uniqueness would not account for the phenomenon of higher 
valuation for an object that is the one-to-RQHPDWHULDOL]DWLRQRIWKHFUHDWRU¶s 
expression. For example, there is no doubt that an abstract painting by 
Mondrian contains unique (distinctive or scarce) symbolic elements. But 
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suppose someone programs a computer algorithm that creates unique 
Mondrian motifs (under the assumption that the artist is still alive), which even 
an expert could not distinguish from motifs that were created by the artist 
himself. Lay intuition would suggest that an algorithm-created motif should be 
valued less than one created by the artist, though from the perspective of 
uniqueness or scarcity, this difference should not matter. For that reason, we 
UHIUDLQIURPODEHOLQJRXUDFFRXQWDV³KXPDQXQLTXHQHVV´EHFDXVHWKLVIRUP
of uniqueness would be inconsistent with existing psychological theories of 
uniqueness.  
Other researchers (Newman & Bloom, 2012) have argued that original 
art objects are preferred over identical duplicates because an original is the 
result of a uniquely creative performance and a high level of physical contact. 
Although we agree that these and various other factors could add to an 
REMHFW¶VSHUFHLYHGYDOXHZHEHOLHYHWKDWWKHVHIDFWRUVGRQRWFDSWXUHWKH
main psychological mechanism underlying the valuation of artwork and 
symbolic artifacts in general, or the reason that people prefer original or hand-
made objects. To illustrate, though creative performance and physical contact 
do play a role in the making of art objects, they apply to functional objects as 
well (e.g., watches). But as we have argued with regards to functional object 
properties, any process of production (e.g., hand vs. machine), or the fact that 
the object is the original and not a duplicate, should only matter if it affects its 
functional performance.  
What about gifts that are also meant to express a unique emotional 
sentiment, RUWKHKLJKYDOXDWLRQVWKDWSDUHQWVLPSXWHRQDFKLOG¶VKDQGLFUDIW"
As argued above, gift expression is different from an artistic expression (Gell 
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1998; Mauss, 1954). $JLIW¶V value derives from an exchange relationship 
(Mauss, 1954), mainly to express reciprocal appreciation or gratitude (e.g., 
the same process would be activated in response to a nicely crafted love 
letter). In contrast, the expression that is represented in an art object or 
artifact does not require an exchange relationship (e.g., publicly displayed 
art). Furthermore, since most children do not intend to perform a unique 
expression through the shape of the object when creating a handicraft (they 
would just try to make something that looks aesthetically appealing or 
realistic), they would not fall under the category of symbolic material objects 
WKDWZHKDYHFKDUDFWHUL]HGKHUH1HYHUWKHOHVVLWPLJKWKDYHµsymbolic YDOXH¶
for the parents in terms of emotional sentiment, or as a placeholder for 
episodic memories that are valued.  
Overview of the Studies 
On the basis of our proposed mechanism, we developed a series of 
hypotheses, which we tested in six experimental studies (plus several 
replications). In order to demonstrate the robustness of our framework, it was 
important to choose people without expertise in any particular product 
category (e.g., the participants are not expert collectors). Participants were 
recruited through both the Mechanical Turk online panel as well as an 
undergraduate subject pool, and were asked to estimate an objeFW¶VYDOXH7R
demonstrate the robustness of our research, we used a broad range of object 
categories spanning from simple consumer objects (tea pot, wine glass, 
vase), to more technological objects (watch), and to different types of works of 
art (sculpture, painting).  
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We first tested the hypothesis that our predicted mechanism only 
applies to objects where the focus lies on symbolic but not functional or 
aesthetic object properties (Experiments 1a and 1b). We showed this with 
artifacts and products (wine glasses and watches) to demonstrate that our 
mechanism does not depend on an art versus non-art dichotomy, but rather 
RQZKHWKHUWKHREMHFW¶VV\PEROLFSURSHUW\LVVDOLHQW. This helped to eliminate 
the alternative explanation that the effect would depend on creative 
performance rather than WKHFUHDWRU¶Vmaterialized expression. Next, we 
showed that the mechanism also applies when there is a series of objects 
(e.g., when a craftsman produces a series of wine glasses) instead of one 
singular object (Experiment 2). Across these studies, we ruled out various 
alternative explanations such as uniqueness and scarcity. Furthermore, we 
then showed that physical contact is just one way of ensuring the FUHDWRU¶V
materialized expression, but not an independent factor underlying our 
mechanism of valuation (Experiment 3). Finally, we showed that duplicates 
would have equally high value as long as the FUHDWRU¶Vmaterialized 
expression is ensured (Experiments 4 and 5). Experiment 5 also 
demonstrated how our mechanism applies to objects of modern art and 
procedures that allow the unlimited production of identical symbolic objects.  
Experiment 1a: Materialized expression and standardization 
Experiment 1a provides an initial empirical demonstration that the 
materialization of WKHFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXHpersonal expression leads to high 
perceived value for a symbolic material object in which the creator has agency 
control over its one-to-one materialized expression (henceforth 
LQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ODEHOHGDVFUHDWRU¶VµXQLTXHH[SUHVVLRQ¶µSHUVRQDO
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H[SUHVVLRQ¶RUMXVWµH[SUHVVLRQ¶. To test this, we manipulated the object 
property (either functional or symbolic) of a common artifact (i.e. wine glass) 
and whether the creator has agency control over the transformation 
(henceforth, (agency) control over the transformation) of the function or the 
personal expression into the material object. For the symbolic object property 
WKLVPHDQVWKDWWKHFUHDWRU¶VSHUVRQDOH[SUHVVLRQLVWUDQVIormed into the 
singular object. For the functional object property it means that it represents 
the functional performance (i.e. durability) that the creator has produced (i.e. 
no intervention by others or machine).  
To manipulate (agency) control over the transformation we told 
participants that for the series of wine glasses that had been produced, the 
variance that naturally occurs in a series of hand-made products is either 
preserved or removed. In the condition where the variance is preserved, every 
single product represents what the craftsman had produced. However, this is 
not any more the case when all products within the series have been 
standardized (i.e., the variance has been removed). The logic behind this 
experimental design is that only in the combination with the symbolic object 
property would agency control over the transformation ensure the one-to-one 
materialized expression (and therefore increase perceived value). This is 
EHFDXVHE\GHILQLWLRQWKHFUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HGH[SUHVVLRQUHTXLUHVa 
symbolic object property. 
We also show that the perception of WKHFUHDWRU¶Vpersonal expression 
mediates our pattern of results. 
Method 
Pilot Study  
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We pretested elements of our experimental design in a pilot study. Details of 
this study can be found in the online appendix. 
Participants and design  
One hundred and ninety-six United States adults (61% females; mean 
age = 35.92, SD = 13.25) were recruited through Mechanical Turk and 
participated in exchange for $1. All data were collected during one round of 
data collection. Since more recent research (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 
2011; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons 2014; Simonsohn 2014) suggested 
that researchers should increase the sample size towards 40-50 per cell, we 
aimed towards this number in this experiment. In a between-subjects, full-
factorial experimental design, participants were randomly assigned to one of 
four conditions: (1) durability (functional property) and preserve variance; (2) 
shape (symbolic property) and preserve variance; (3) durability (functional 
property) and remove variance; (4) shape (symbolic property) and remove 
variance. 
Procedure  
As part of a research study, participants read one of four scenarios. In 
each scenario, participants read about wine glasses. We chose this object 
category because it can have both symbolic (shape) and functional (durability) 
properties. In the µtype of object property¶ variable, we either emphasized the 
symbolic (shape) or the functional property (durability).  
Participants read one of the following scenarios: 
Company T is a leading producer of premium crystal wine glasses. 
 
Shape (symbolic property) & Preserve variance: The above picture shows one wine 
glass from its Huemer Roehmer 2010 series. All glasses from this series are 100% 
hand-blown by highly skilled glassmakers. Glassmaking is a unique craft and every 
single glass would look slightly different. That is, there are no two glasses within a 
series whose design is identical.  
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Shape (symbolic property) & Remove variance. The above picture shows one wine 
glass from its Huemer Roehmer 2010 series. All glasses from this series are 100% 
hand-blown by highly skilled glassmakers. Glassmaking is a unique craft and every 
single glass would look slightly different. That is, there are no two glasses within a 
series whose design is identical. For this series, the company has developed a 
special crafts-technique, which ensures that every wine-glass from the Huemer 
Roehmer 2010 series would in fact look identical. So there is no variance in the 
design of the individual wine glasses from this series. 
 
Durability (functional property) & Preserve variance: The above picture shows one 
wine glass from its Huemer Roehmer 2010 series. All glasses from this series are 
100% hand-blown by highly skilled glassmakers. Glassmaking is a special craft and it 
is the nature of manual crystal glass production that there is slight variance in the 
durability of each glass. That is, some glasses would just lose their shine earlier than 
others. 
 
Durability (functional property) & Remove variance: The above picture shows one 
wine glass from its Huemer Roehmer 2010 series. All glasses from this series are 
100% hand-blown by highly skilled glassmakers. Glassmaking is a special craft and it 
is the nature of manual crystal glass production that there is slight variance in the 
durability of each glass. That is, some glasses would just lose their shine earlier than 
others. For this series, the company has developed a special crafts-technique, which 
ensures that every wine-glass from the Huemer Roehmer 2010 series would have 
exactly the same (high) durability. So every single glass from this series would keep 
its shine equally long. 
 
 
Next, participants answered the following question as a measure of 
their perceived valuation RIWKHWDUJHWREMHFW³:KDWLV\RXUSHUFHLYHGYDOXHRI
this product´? (1 = very low value, 9 = very high value).1 
Afterwards, subjects answered questions for the purpose of testing 
ZKHWKHURXULQWHUDFWLRQLVPHGLDWHGE\WKHFRQVWUXFWRIµSHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶V
SHUVRQDOH[SUHVVLRQ¶:HRSHUDWLRQDOL]HGWKLVFRQVWUXFWĮ ZLWKWKH
following three items: (1) This product is the result of a very personal 
expression from a person with rare skills, (2) It seems that the person who 
designed or made this product has transferred a part of him/her self & 
personality onto this product, and (3) Such a product is the result of a 
personal expression. 
                                                        
1 For all experiment scenarios, disclosure information about additional variables that were 
included can be found in the online appendix.  
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Participants rated these items on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly 
agree) scale after they had completed the value measures. We also included 
a question about perceived scarcity, in which participants responded to the 
item ³7KLVSURGXFWLVUDUH´ However, for this and all other studies, we 
UHIUDLQHGIURPDVNLQJWKHTXHVWLRQKRZ³XQLTXH´WKHREMHFWLVEHFDXVHRIWKH
LQFRQVLVWHQF\EHWZHHQOD\SHRSOH¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIXQLTXHQHVVDQGZKDW
this construct means in psychological science (see argumentation above in 
the conceptual development).  
Results 
There were no data removed for the analyses. Consistent with our 
predictions, a 2 (shape vs. durability) x 2 (preserve variance vs. remove 
variance) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on perceived value revealed a 
significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 192) = 13.60, p = .0003, 
Ș2 = .07. As predicted (see Figure 1), perceived value was highest when the 
ZLQHJODVV¶shape was emphasized (symbolic property), and the variance was 
preserved (perceived value: M = 6.87, SE = .25, CI [6.3, 7.3]), as compared to 
when it was removed (perceived value: M = 5.82, SE = .25, CI [5.3, 6.3]), and 
compares favorably as well against the condition in which the emphasis was 
on durability (functional property) when the variance was preserved 
(perceived value: M = 5.97, SE = .25, CI [5.4, 6.4]), but not when it was 
removed (perceived value: M = 6.79, SE = .25, CI [6.2, 7.2]). There were no 
significant main effects. 
Planned contrasts provided further support for our predictions. 
Participants in the shape and preserve variance condition perceived the 
object to be of higher value as compared to participants in the shape and 
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removed variance condition (perceived value: t(191) = -2.92, p = .001, d = 
.54). Participants in the durability and remove variance condition also rated 
the object higher in perceived value than participants in the durability and 
preserve variance condition, t(191) = 2.28, p = .01, Ș2 = .02, d = .51. We 
performed planned contrast analyses that were relevant to either provide 
evidence for, or provide evidence against our hypotheses.  
 
 
<Insert Figure 1> 
 
Mediation analysis 
We argued above that the described valuation process occurs because 
the creator (e.g., artist or crafts(wo)man) of a particular symbolic material 
object has agency control over his or her one-to-one materialized expression. 
We tested whether µSHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ¶ would mediate the effect 
of agency control over the transformation on symbolic object property. 
Specifically, we examined to what extent the interaction effect of object 
property X agency control over the transformation would be mediated by 
perceived personal expression of the creator. This analysis was tested in the 
context of mediated moderation (Muller, Yudd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Preacher, 
Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). A first regression examined the effect of the two 
main effects and the interaction of object property and agency control over the 
transformation on perceived value. This analysis confirmed a significant 
interaction (E = -0.46, t(194) = -3.69, p = .0003). A second equation including 
the same factors was regressed on the mediator, SHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶V
expression, and revealed a significant interaction (E = -0.49, t(196) = -3.11, p 
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= .002) as well as a significant main effect (E = 0.31, t(196) = 2.00, p = .04) on  
agency control over the transformation, indicating that preserving the variance 
would enhance µSHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ¶across both conditions, and in 
particular for the shape condition. The last equation added the mediator and 
the interaction between the mediator and the agency control over the 
transformation factor to the original model used in equation 1. This analysis 
showed that the object property X agency control over the transformation 
influence was reduced, but still remained significant (E = -0.20, t(194) = -2.18, 
p = .03). On the other hand, the main effect of SHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ
on perceived value reached significance (E = 0.53, t(194) = 12.79, p = .0001). 
In order to test whether the reduction was significant, we ran two subsequent 
mediation analyses within the durability (functional) and the shape (symbolic 
property) conditions. Within durability, agency control over the transformation 
did not predict the mediator (E = -0.2, t(98) = -0.95, p = .34), whereas within 
shape, agency control over the transformation  significantly predicted 
perceived value (E = 0.5, t(97) = 2.79, p = .006) as well as the mediator (E = 
0.8, t(99) = 3.57, p = .0006). When including the mediator as a predictor, 
agency control over the transformation became non-significant (E = 0.07, t(97) 
= 0.5, p = .62) and the mediator remained a significant predictor (E = 0.58, 
t(97) = 9.88, p = .0001) on perceived value. A Sobel test (z = 3.3, p = .0007) 
showed that the mediator fully mediated the relationship between agency 
control over the transformation on perceived value within the shape 
conditions. This indicates that valuation is only mediated by perceived 
FUHDWRU¶Vpersonal expression within the shape conditions, but not within the 
durability conditions. We ran two final regression analyses in order to test 
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whether perceived scarcity might mediate our results. Within the durability 
conditions, agency control over the transformation did not affect perceived 
scarcity (p = .16). Within the shape conditions, perceived scarcity was higher 
when the variance was preserved (p = .02), and it mediated the relationship 
between agency control over the transformation and perceived value. That is, 
perceived scarcity was a significant predictor on perceived value (p = .0001) 
and agency control over the transformation became non-significant (p = .20). 
However, when also including our mediation variable into this regression, 
perceived scarcity became a non-significant (p = .51) predictor and the 
mediation variable continued to be significant (p = .0001). This indicates that it 
is not perceived scarcity, which underlies our pattern of results but perceived 
FUHDWRU¶Vpersonal expression.  
Experiment 1b: Replication with technological product 
In Experiment 1b, our goal was to replicate Experiment 1a with a 
technological product (watch). We followed the same procedure as in 
Experiment 1a and manipulated the type of object property as well as agency 
control over the transformation. In addition to that, we added another object 
property condition, namely aesthetic property (i.e., beauty of the design, but 
without any symbolic meaning). This allows us to provide a stronger test for 
our hypothesis that symbolic object property is different from aesthetic object 
property. The former refers to a visual symbol that is used to express a 
particular content or meaning (e.g., Soda Can = critique of consumerism), 
whereas the latter represents a visual pattern that activates a response (i.e., 
feeling of aesthetic appeal) based on an evolved psychological adaptation 
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towards certain ecologically favorable stimuli (e.g., preference towards 
symmetric figures because they indicate biological health).  
In line with the argumentation for Experiment 1a, we predict that our 
mechanism of valuation also underlies valuation of technological objects (e.g., 
a watch) as long as they contain a salient symbolic object property (e.g., a 
symbolic motif). We applied the same manipulation for agency control over 
the transformation from Experiment 1a.  
Method 
Participants and design  
We recruited three hundred and sixty United States adults (63% 
female; mean age = 35.71, SD = 12.47) through the same online panel as in 
the previous experiments, who participated in a series of unrelated studies in 
exchange for $1. Again, all data were collected during one round of data 
collection. In a between-subjects full-factorial experimental design, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions: (1) accuracy 
(functional property) and preserve variance; (2) symbolic design (symbolic 
property) and preserve variance; (3) aesthetic design (aesthetic property) and 
preserve variance; (4) accuracy (functional property) and remove variance; (5) 
symbolic design (symbolic property) and remove variance; (6) aesthetic 
design (aesthetic property) and remove variance.  
Procedure  
Apart from adding the aesthetic conditions, we used the same 
procedure as described in Experiment 1a.  
Participants read one of the following scenarios: 
Swiss company G.D. produces classic-style handmade pocket watches. 
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Accuracy (functional property) & Preserve variance: The picture above shows one 
pocket watch from the Fabri series, which contains a variety of cultural symbols from 
the region where these watches have been produced for almost a century. 
The company recently started to use a new high-tech machinery, which improves the 
precision of each design (so the design looks more vivid). However, because the 
watches are handmade, the accuracy of each watch within the series can vary.  
 
Accuracy (functional property) & Remove variance: The picture above shows one 
pocket watch from the Fabri series, which contains a variety of cultural symbols from 
the region where these watches have been produced for almost a century. 
The company recently started to use a new high-tech machinery, which improves the 
precision of each design (so the design looks more vivid) and also standardizes the 
accuracy of each watch within the series. So, even though, all watches are 
handmade (and accuracy can vary from watch to watch), every watch within this 
series would now have equal accuracy. 
 
Aesthetic design (aesthetic property) & Preserve variance: The picture above shows 
one pocket watch from the Fabri series. Its design contains a combination of natural 
motifs (mostly types of leaves and flowers from the region) meant to make the watch 
look very beautiful. However, the motif does not carry any particular symbolic 
meaning, because the purpose is not to make an artistic statement but to make the 
watch look beautiful. Each pocket watch from the Fabri series contains these natural 
motifs but no two watches would look the same, because every watchmaker has 
KLVKHURZQZD\LQµWUDQVODWLQJ¶WKHPLQWRWKHZDWFK7KHFRPSDQ\UHFHQWO\VWDUWHGWR
use a new high-tech machinery, which improves the precision of each design (so the 
design looks more vivid) while still preserving the above mentioned motif-variance 
that exists between the watches.  
 
Aesthetic design (aesthetic property) & Remove variance: The picture above shows 
one pocket watch from the Fabri series. Its design contains a combination of natural 
motifs (mostly types of leaves and flowers from the region) meant to make the watch 
look very beautiful. However, the motif does not carry any particular symbolic 
meaning, because the purpose is not to make an artistic statement but to make the 
watch look beautiful. Each pocket watch from the Fabri series contains these natural 
motifs but no two watches would look the same, because every watchmaker has 
KLVKHURZQZD\LQµWUDQVODWLQJ¶WKHPLQWRWKHZDWFK7KHFRPSDQ\UHFHQWO\VWDUWHGWR
use a new high-tech machinery, which improves the precision of each design (so the 
design looks more vivid) and also standardizes the motifs across all watches within 
the Fabri series. So every watch within this series would now have the identical 
(beautiful) design. 
 
Symbolic design (symbolic property) & Preserve variance: The picture above shows 
one pocket watch from the Fabri series, which contains a variety of cultural symbols 
from the region where these watches have been produced for almost a century. Each 
pocket watch from the Fabri series contains these cultural symbols but no two 
watches would look the same, because every watchmaker has his/her own way in 
µWUDQVODWLQJ¶WKHVHFXOWXUDOV\PEROVLQWRWKHZDWFK7KHFRPSDQ\UHFHQWO\VWDUWHGWR
use a new high-tech machinery, which improves the precision of each design (so the 
design looks more vivid) while still preserving the above mentioned variance that 
exists between the watches.  
 
Symbolic design (symbolic property) & Remove variance: The picture above shows 
one pocket watch from the Fabri series, which contains a variety of cultural symbols 
from the region where these watches have been produced for almost a century. Each 
pocket watch from the Fabri series contains these cultural symbols but no two 
watches would look the same, because every watchmaker has his/her own way in 
µWUDQVODWLQJ¶WKHVHFXOWXUDOV\PEROVLQWRWKHZDWFK7KHFRPSDQ\UHFHQWO\VWDUWHGWR
use a new high-tech machinery, which improves the precision of each design (so the 
design looks more vivid) and also standardizes the designs across all watches within 
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the Fabri series. So every watch within this series would now have the identical 
design. 
 
 
Next, participants respond to the same value measure as used in the 
previous experiment: perceived value (1 = very low value, 9 = very high 
value).  
Results 
Just like in Experiment 1a, there were no data removed for the 
analyses. Figure 2 shows the results from this experiment. We followed the 
most recent research (Simonsohn et al., 2014; Simonsohn, 2014) about the 
requirement for statistical power when conducting ANOVAs and therefore 
decided to conduct three separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs instead of one 2 X 3 
ANOVA. As the research by Simonsohn (2014) (see also Simonsohn et al., 
2014 for a more detailed discussion) suggests, more complex ANOVAs 
require much higher sample sizes than previously assumed to produce 
sufficient statistical power (e.g., close to 1,000 for a 2 X 3 ANOVA and above 
1,600 for 3-way ANOVAs). 
Consistent with our predictions, a 2 (symbolic design vs. accuracy) x 2 
(preserve variance vs. remove variance) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
perceived value revealed a significant interaction between the two factors, 
F(1, 242) = 4.18, p = .04Ș2 = .02, and a significant main effect on agency 
control over the transformation F(1, 242) = 17.20, p  Ș2 = .07. As 
predicted (see Figure 2), perceived value was higher when the ZDWFK¶V
symbolic design was emphasized and the variance was preserved (perceived 
value: M = 7.15, SE = .22, CI [6.7, 7.5]) as compared to when it was removed 
(perceived value: M = 5.77, SE = .22, CI [5.3, 6.2]). In the conditions in which 
the emphasis was on accuracy, perceived value was M = 6.81 (SE = .21, CI 
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[6.3, 7.2]) when the variance was preserved and M = 6.34 (SE = .22, CI [5.9, 
6.8]) when it was removed. Planned contrasts showed that this difference was 
significant within the symbolic property conditions (t(242) = 4.34, p = .0001, d 
= .74) but not within the accuracy conditions (p = .13). Again, we only 
performed planned contrast analyses for differences that were relevant to 
either provide evidence for or against our hypotheses. So we do not have 
predictions about the value difference between functional and symbolic 
property, as this might lie in the idiosyncratic nature of the individual product 
category. It could be that for some product categories, functionality is more 
important, and in other product categories, symbolic expression is more 
important.  
Also consistent with our predictions, a 2 (symbolic design vs. aesthetic 
design) x 2 (preserve variance vs. remove variance) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on perceived value revealed a significant interaction between the 
two factors, F(1, 231) = 3.87, p  Ș2 = .02, and a significant main effect on 
agency control over the transformation F(1, 231) = 13.39, p  Ș2 = .05. 
Again, as predicted (see Figure 2), perceived value was higher when the 
ZDWFK¶VV\PEROLFGHVLJQZDVHPSKDVL]HGDQGWKHYDULDQFHZDVpreserved 
(perceived value: M = 7.15, SE = .24, CI [6.6, 7.6]) as compared to when it 
was removed (perceived value: M = 5.77, SE = .24, CI [5.2, 6.2]). In the 
conditions in which the emphasis was on aesthetic, perceived value was M = 
6.37, SE = .24, CI [5.9, 6.8]) when the variance was preserved and M = 5.96, 
SE = .25, CI [5.4, 6.4]) when it was removed. Planned contrast tests showed 
that again, the differences within the aesthetic quality conditions were not 
statistically significant (p = .24). Finally, we performed a 2 X 2 ANOVA 
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between the two accuracy and aesthetic conditions, but this interaction was 
not significant (p = .9), and there were also no significant main effects.  
 
<Insert Figure 2> 
 
 
Further replications 
We also replicated Experiment 1a with an undergraduate student 
sample (n = 73). The results from this replication study were consistent with 
the pattern of results from Experiment 1a except that durability was not 
affected by the manipulation (i.e., there was no increase in value for removed 
variance for durability). Details are reported in the online appendix.  
Discussion 
The response patterns in experiments 1a and 1b provided evidence in 
support of our hypotheses. Perceived value was significantly increased when 
symbolic property co-occurred with agency control over the transformation, 
because only then would the creator be perceived to have agency control 
over the materialized expression. This is because every single object 
HPERGLHVXQLTXHPRPHQWVRIWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHVLQJXODUREMHFW 
Once this information is removed (i.e., standardized) the creator loses agency 
control over the one-to-one materialization to represent these unique 
instances of expression (because two objects represent the identical instance 
of expression). Yet, for both functional and aesthetic property, perceived value 
was either not affected by agency control over the transformation (watch; 
wine-glass in study with undergraduates) or even increased (in the wine-glass 
study with MTurk subjects). We do not have any specific hypotheses for this 
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difference across product categories. But intuitively it would also make sense, 
because less durability-variance would likely increase the perception of 
functional properties and perhaps this is particularly salient with wine glasses 
among adult participants who should be more familiar with this product 
category. 7KHODEHOµKLJKGXUDELOLW\¶(in the wineglass study) when variance is 
removed could have partially contributed to this effect among this group of 
subjects.  
Our mediation analysis allowed us to better clarify this point. It is 
possible that a person uses different standards of valuation for symbolic and 
functional object properties. With the mediation analysis, we were able to 
show that within the symbolic property conditions, perceived value was 
mediated by perceived FUHDWRU¶Vexpression. These results provide stronger 
support for our argumentation that high valuations would be elicited for 
objects with symbolic property and where the creator has agency control over 
the materialized expression in the object.  
There are some other potential limitations that need to be addressed. 
First, in the symbolic property & preserve variance condition in Experiment 1a, 
perceived value could have been partially affected by the fact that the 
standardized products deviated from the norm, as there is usually some 
design variance among hand-made wine glasses. But Experiment 1b helps to 
control for this alternative explanation since the effect is not observed within 
the aesthetic property conditions, even though it describes the same type of 
deviance from the norm. Second, there are slight differences in text content 
and length across conditions, which is unavoidable in the process of 
operationalizing experimental conditions in complex phenomena regarding 
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symbolic material objects. That is, ideally one would just change a few words 
and keep everything else equal. But, this is not always possible in the 
examination of research topics that target constructs such as art, symbolism 
or WKHFUHDWRU¶Vexpression. For example, merely changing words such as art 
with artifact or symbolic with aesthetic (or even priming subjects with such 
words) could potentially lead to Gricean demand effects or potentially even 
third variable problems, due to the connotations that people ascribe to such 
terms. The only solution to this problem (which is also used by other 
researchers such as Newman and Bloom in their 2012 article) is by trying to 
counterbalance the content across conditions. However, we carefully 
compared text-content and text-length vis-a-vis our pattern of results and we 
do not find any evidence in any of our studies that these factors could have 
systematically biased the results (see online appendix for details).  
Experiment 2: Source of symbolic information 
The previous experiments showed that our suggested valuation 
mechanism requires the co-RFFXUUHQFHRIDQREMHFW¶VV\PEROLFSURSHUW\DQG 
the perception that the FUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQLVrepresented in the object (i.e. 
variance is preserved). Hence, the mechanism of materialized expression 
does not apply to objects with purely functional or aesthetic properties. This is 
because only a symbolic object property would allow the creator to embody 
WKHFUHDWRU¶Vexpression. Experiment 2 will more specifically focus on the 
GLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQV\PEROLFPRWLIVWKDWFDUU\WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ, 
because they were made by a human being, versus those motifs that are 
merely unique. This allows us to eliminate the alternative hypothesis that our 
results could be explained by uniqueness. We therefore described an object 
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(vase) whose motif was either created by a human being or a computer 
algorithm. Although both motifs would have aesthetic object properties, only 
the former can function as a symbolic object because it carries the expression 
of the creator. Furthermore, we manipulated the uniqueness of the motifs. We 
did this by informing subjects that the producer had designed a series of ten 
premium vases, but in one condition, the artist or the algorithm created either 
one unique design that was duplicated onto the other vases, or each of the 
ten vases had uniquely different designs, but which were clearly identifiable 
as belonging to the same series. Consistent with our hypotheses, the vases 
with the highest perceived value should be the ones where each vase had a 
uniquely different design, but only when a human being designed them (see 
procedure 2 in Table 1, p. 10). This is because only then would a human 
creator have agency control over the materialized expression for each 
individual object. The same is not possible for the algorithm created designs, 
because even though they are all uniquely different, they do not represent the 
personal expression of the creator because they were not made by a human 
being. Likewise, the one-to-one materialization is violated when one human-
designed motif is machine-duplicated onto more than one object, because the 
PRWLIZKLFKUHSUHVHQWVRQHXQLTXHLQVWDQFHRIDFUHDWRU¶VSHUVRQDO
expression, is copied onto more than one object (just like procedure 1 in 
Table 1).  
It is possible that participants would doubt that a software algorithm 
could generate design motifs that are indistinguishable from those made by 
an artist. To prevent this, we chose designs that were similar to the ones that 
modern computer screen-savers would generate. Furthermore, we included a 
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question at the end of the survey, where we asked subjects in the software-
algorithm conditions whether they believed that they could tell the difference 
between a design that is generated by a software algorithm versus one that is 
made directly by a human.  
Finally, we again include various items to measure whether the object 
is perceived as scarce or is perceived as the result of WKHFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXH
expression, which allows us to test whether our pattern of results is mediated 
by this construct.  
Method 
Participants and design  
We recruited one hundred and seventy-seven United States adults 
(56% female; mean age = 34.82, SD = 12.51), through the same online panel 
as in the previous experiments, who participated in a series of unrelated 
studies in exchange for $1. Just like in the previous experiments, we collected 
all data in one round of data collection, and the sample size was again 
determined by aiming towards 40-50 subjects per cell. In a between-subjects 
full-factorial experimental design, we described the object (vase) as either 
designed by a designer (human-designed manipulation), or by a creativity 
algorithm, and whether a series of these vases would all have the same or 
different designs (uniqueness manipulation).  
Participants read one of the following scenarios: 
Company E is a leading producer of glass vases. It produces vases for both premium 
markets (i.e. high price) and typical consumer markets (i.e. mid-price).   
 
Designer-made design & Unique designs (ten different designs). The above picture 
shows one of the FRPSDQ\¶VSUHPLXPKLJK-price) vases, which is from the Nuova 
Serenga series. There exist only 10 vases from this series. Each of them was 
designed by renowned glass designer Swena Ingen. She would create unique 
designs for each of the 10 vases (i.e. they are 10 unique designs, but clearly 
identifiable as being from to the same series), which are then individually produced 
by fully automated glass manufacturing machinery. 
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Designer-made design & No unique designs (one design duplicated onto the other 
objects). 7KHDERYHSLFWXUHVKRZVRQHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHPLXPKLJK-price) vases, 
which is from the Nuova Serenga series. There exist only 10 vases from this series. 
Each of them was designed by renowned glass designer Swena Ingen. She would 
design one unique design-prototype for the entire series. Then, fully automated glass 
manufacturing machinery would produce 10 identical duplicates from this design-
prototype. 
 
Algorithm-made design & Unique designs (ten different designs). The above picture 
shows one of thHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHPLXPKLJK-price) vases, which is from the Nuova 
Serenga series. There exist only 10 vases from this series. Each of them was 
GHVLJQHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VXQLTXHFUHDWLYLW\DOJRULWKP7KHFUHDWLYLW\DOJRULWKPZRXOG
create unique designs for each of the 10 vases (i.e. they are 10 unique designs, but 
clearly identifiable as being from the same series), which are then individually 
produced by fully automated glass manufacturing machinery. 
 
Algorithm-made design & No unique designs (one design duplicated onto the other 
objects). 7KHDERYHSLFWXUHVKRZVRQHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHPLXPKLJK-price) vases, 
which is from the Nuova Serenga series. There exist only 10 vases from this series. 
(DFKRIWKHPZDVGHVLJQHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\¶VXQLTXHFreativity algorithm. The 
creativity algorithm would design one unique design-prototype for the entire series. 
Then fully automated glass manufacturing machinery would produce 10 identical 
duplicates from this design-prototype. 
 
Next, participants answered the same set of questions from 
Experiments 1a and 1b to measure perceived value, perception of FUHDWRU¶V 
expression, and perceived scarcity. To check whether our manipulations were 
working as intended, we also asked participants if they thought that they could 
tell the difference between a vase design that was designed by a human 
being versus a design that was generated by a computer algorithm.  
Results 
We excluded one extreme outlier (more than 3 standard deviations 
below mean), who also showed a very strange response pattern because this 
person provided only extreme responses (1 or 9). Nonetheless, including this 
VXEMHFW¶VUHVSRQVHVGLGQRWFKDQJHWKHRYHUDOOSDWWHUQRIUHVXOWV Consistent 
with our predictions, a 2 (human-designed: yes vs. no) x 2 (unique designs: 
yes vs. no) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on perceived value revealed a 
significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 173) = 5.49, p = .02,  Ș2 = 
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.03. As predicted (see Figure 3), perceived value was highest when the vase 
design was designed by a designer and each of the ten vases had a uniquely 
different design (M = 7.33, SE = .28, CI [6.7, 7.9]) as compared to when they 
all had identical designs (M
 
= 6.59, SE = .28, CI [6.0, 7.1]) or when the vases 
were designed by a creativity algorithm for both when they had unique (M
 
= 
5.71, SE = .27, CI [5.1, 6.2]) or identical designs (M
 
= 6.28, SE = .27, CI [5.7, 
6.8]). There was also a significant main effect of being human-designed, F(1, 
173) = 11.66, p = .0008, Ș2 = .06, which shows that the human-generated 
design generated higher valuations compared to the algorithm-generated 
design across all conditions. 
Planned contrast tests provided further support for our predictions. 
Participants in the human-designed/uniqueness condition perceived the object 
to be of higher value as compared to participants in the human-designed/non 
uniqueness condition, t(172) = 1.84, p = .03, d = .44. The unique designs 
were valued less than non-unique designs within the algorithm-designed 
conditions, but this difference was not significant (t(172) = -1.46, p = .07). 
Furthermore, human-designed/unique was higher than algorithm-
designed/unique (t(172) = 4.04, p < .0001, d = .78), but not within the non-
unique conditions (p = .4)  
 
<Insert Figure 3> 
Mediation analysis 
To test whether SHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶Vexpression mediates the interaction 
between human-designed and uniqueness, we performed three regression 
analyses. A first regression examined the effect of the two main effects and 
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the interaction of human-designed and uniqueness on perceived value. This 
analysis showed a significant interaction (E = 0.33, t(175) = 2.34, p = .02) and 
a significant main effect of human-designed (E = -0.48, t(175) -3.41, p = 
.0008). A second equation including the same factors was regressed on the 
mediator, SHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶V expression, and revealed a significant 
interaction (E = 0.38, t(175) = 2.40, p = .01) as well as a significant main effect 
(E = -1.51, t(175) = -9.32, p < .0001) of human-designed, indicating that letting 
a designer design the vase would enhance perceived value across both 
conditions, and in particular for the uniqueness condition.  
The last equation added the mediator and the interaction between the 
mediator and the uniqueness factor to the original model used in equation 1. 
This analysis showed that the human-designed x uniqueness interaction was 
no longer significant (E = -0.05, t(175) = -0.35, p = .72). The main effect of 
FUHDWRU¶V expression reached significance (E = 0.52, t(175) = 9.60, p < .0001). 
The main effect of the human-designed factor continued to be significant (E = 
0.36, t(175) = 2.50, p < .01), and the interaction between the uniqueness 
factor and the mediator also were significant (E = -0.11, t(175) = -2.12, p = 
.03). This suggests that the degree of SHUFHLYHGFUHDWRU¶Vexpression 
mediated the relationship between the perception of human-designed versus 
algorithm-designed and valuation. We also tested whether scarcity would 
mediate our pattern of results, but the two manipulated factors did not 
significantly predict perceived scarcity (p = .12). 
The question of whether participants felt that they could notice the 
difference between a designer- or algorithm-designed vase received a mean 
score of 1.57 (sd = .97) on a 9-point scale (1 = lowest) within both algorithm 
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conditions, and the difference between the uniqueness and non-uniqueness 
condition was not significant (t = -0.84). Note that we asked this question only 
in the algorithm conditions because such a question would not make sense in 
conditions where a design creativity algorithm did not exist.  
Replication 
We also replicated the study, but this time with an average quality vase 
instead of one with premium quality. For this replication study, all conditions 
from Experiment 2 remained the same, except that the description of the 
product was about an average quality product, produced for the mass market. 
As predicted, there was no significant interaction (p = .53) and no significant 
main effects (p = .27 and .72) when the product was not a premium product. 
This lends additional support for our hypotheses, that high perceived value 
requires the object to be the result of a FUHDWRU¶Vunique personal expression 
DQGQRWMXVWDQ\WKLQJµKDQG- or human-PDGH¶ (e.g., tourist souvenirs).  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 provided additional support for our hypothesis that 
symbolic object valuation is determined by the one-to-one materialization of 
WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQLQWRWKHSDUWLFXODUPDWHULDOREMHFW. Therefore, the 
condition where the vase-design was made by a human being (and not by an 
algorithm) and in which every single vase had a uniquely different design 
generated the highest perceived value. As shown by the mediation analysis, 
only this interaction generated the perception of FUHDWRU¶V expression as a 
consequence of the symbolic object property, where the creator has agency 
control of the materialized expression into every single object (because the 
creator designed 10 different motifs which he or she has one-to-one 
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materialized into 10 singular objects). Participants did not believe that they 
could tell the difference between a designer- or algorithm-designed vase, 
which indicates that for our design motifs, subjects assumed that algorithms 
could create motifs that are of equal aesthetic quality with what a designer or 
artist could make. These findings support our argumentation that our 
mechanism cannot be explained by uniqueness, because only the human-
made unique designs lead to high valuation, but not the algorithm created 
unique designs, and these results rule out extant psychological theories of 
uniqueness (as argued in the introduction), which posit that this difference 
would not matter. Likewise, our results cannot be explained by other variables 
such as perceived aesthetic appeal, as this would not depend on who 
designed the motif and whether the object carries a one of a kind motif, 
versus one that was replicated onto 10 other objects.  
These results confirm our prediction that a core factor for our 
mechanism of symbolic object valuation is that the creator needs to be 
perceived as having agency control over the materialized expression for each 
single object, because only then would there be a direct representation of the 
FUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHVLQJXODUREMHFW. As long as this is the case, our 
mechanism of valuation occurs for a single object (i.e., only one of a kind) or a 
series of objects. There is another important difference between the current 
experiment and the previous experiments. In this experiment, the symbolic 
PRWLIUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXHH[SUHVVLRQKDSSHQHGEefore it 
became materialized in the object with automatic machinery. This shows that 
our effect does not require the creator to physically shape the expression into 
the object, but that this could also be outsourced to a machine. In other 
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words, using machines does not affect our proposed mechanism of valuation 
as long as ten motifs, representing ten unique expressions, become 
transformed into ten different end-objects. This is not the case when a 
machine duplicates one motif onto several material objects, as more than one 
end-REMHFWZRXOGUHSUHVHQWWKHVDPHLQVWDQFHRIWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ 
(compare procedures 2 vs. 1 in Table 1, p. 10). 
Our results show a main effect on the human-designed motifs, which 
intuitively makes sense because subjects may, on average, expect human-
made designs (especially if a famous designer or artist made them), to be of 
higher value than algorithm-made designs.  
In line with the findings from the previous experiments, these results 
provide additional evidence for our proposed mechanism of symbolic material 
object valuation. High perceived value only occurs for those symbolic objects 
where the symbolic expression originates from an act of creation and its 
embedded unique expression, and where this expression is one-to-one 
materialized into the singular material object.  
Measuring Perceived Value by Comparing Originals with Duplicates 
The previous studies showed that unlike functional or aesthetic objects, 
symbolic objects (artwork and symbolic artifacts) achieve high perceived 
value because they represent the FUHDWRU¶Vmaterialized expression. However, 
this only occurs when the creator had agency control over the one-to-one 
materialization of his expression in the individual object, which for instance is 
the case when the natural variance between a series of hand-made products 
is preserved. We also showed that the mechanism cannot be simulated by 
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uniquely different motifs that had been created by a creativity algorithm, 
because these motifs were not the resXOWRIDFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ 
But there is at least one psychological concept that seems to be quite 
similar to our predicted mechanism of the perception of a one-to-one 
materialized expression. In many cultures, people might attribute a certain 
µaura¶ (see Benjamin 1936/1968) to artists as people with special skills. That 
is, people might just assign higher value to an art-object because it was 
created, associated with or merely touched by a special human being, and 
hence WKLVSHUVRQ¶Vµspirit¶ is perceived to have transferred into the object 
(e.g., Newman & Bloom, 2012; Newman, Diesendruck, & Bloom, 2011).  
The problem with testing this alternative explanation against our story 
is that such attributions might automatically occur when subjects compare 
objects that are perceived DVµDUW¶ZLWKRWKHUVWKDWDUHperceived as 
µGHFRUDWLYH¶RUPHUHO\µDHVWKHWLF¶/LNHZLVH, it is also challenging to describe 
such similar constructs in a way that there would be no conceptual overlap 
between them. For example, it seems unlikely that subjects could perceive a 
décor object as only consisting of aesthetic properties and zero symbolic 
properties. In reality, we should always expect some slight overlap.  
In order to provide evidence against these possible confounds, we 
apply a different kind of valuation measure for the remaining experiments, 
which will allow us to provide a stronger test for our predicted mechanism that 
high perceived value depends on the one-to-one materialization of the 
expression. For experiments 3-5, we therefore measure an object¶s perceived 
value by comparing the drop in perceived value of duplicates or second 
copies that were made from originals (see Newman & Bloom, 2012). For 
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instance, let us assume that in one situation, someone creates an art object, 
and another situation in which the same person creates a decorative object. 
As argued above and in the conceptual development, the former would 
contain expressive meaning, whereas the latter is just aesthetically appealing. 
Obviously we would expect WKDWSHRSOHSHUFHLYHDQµDUW-REMHFW¶WRKDYHPRUH
YDOXHDVFRPSDUHGWRDµGHFRUDWLYH¶REMHFW(some reasons could be the ones 
just mentioned, but also because of assumed higher creativity, scarcity, etc.). 
But let us now assume that the creator of the original would make identical 
duplicates from both objects. In general, a duplicate would be of lower 
perceived value than its original. But the the value of a duplicate compared to 
its corresponding original (henceforth described as the decrease in perceived 
value of the duplicate compared to its original) should be essentially the same 
for both the décor- and the art-duplicate if the creator of the original made 
them (like adding another unit to a series of either décor- or art objects). For 
the purpose of our study, we will use this difference in decreased perceived 
value across the two pairs of original-duplicates as our baseline measure. 
Against this baseline, we can then compare the decrease in perceived value 
of other pairs of original-duplicates. For example, imagine the decrease in 
perceived value for the creator-made décor-duplicates is 1.5 (on a scale from 
1-9) and for the creator-made art-duplicates it is also 1.5. So the difference in 
decrease in value (i.e., how much less the duplicate is valued compared to 
the original) across creator-made pairs of original-duplicates is 0. In a second 
step, we can use this number and compare the decreased value of other pairs 
(e.g., where the duplicates were made by an assistant). The big advantage of 
this relative value measure is that it allows us to compare two more or less 
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identical objects (i.e., original against duplicate). In a second step, we can 
then examine how single factors influence the difference in perceived value 
between the original and the duplicate. With this procedure, one could even 
compare paintings from world famous artists with paintings of lesser known 
local artists. Perceived value for the former would be much higher, but for 
both groups, the decrease in value should be largely the same if duplicates 
were made by the creators of the original paintings.  
As was recommended by proponents in the most recent scientific 
debate about sample size (Simonsohn et al. 2014; Simonsohn 2014) in social 
and behavioral experiments, we needed very large sample sizes (above 400), 
to ensure that the baseline-differences (or sometimes non-differences) are 
unlikely to be the result of other variables or random error. We therefore 
collected data for all these studies in one sitting. Participants were told that 
they would participate in a series of unrelated studies, where experimental 
conditions across the studies were presented to them in a randomized order.  
Experiment 3: Materialized Expression and Amount of Physical Contact 
Experiment 3 provides a first demonstration of this experimental 
paradigm by also eliminating the important alternative explanation, which 
others (Newman & Bloom, 2012; Newman et al., 2011) have described as the 
contagion effect (i.e., the amount of physical touching leading to a belief of a 
transfer of essence RUµDXUD¶(Benjamin 1936/1968) from artist to object). 
Consistent with anecdotal evidence, and with previous research about art 
valuation (Newman & Bloom, 2012), the creation of highly valued symbolic 
material objects often involves a high amount of physical touching. We argue 
however, that this so called contagion effect can be better subsumed by our 
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suggested mechanism, which does not require contact. In other words, when 
the creator touches the object, he or she ensures that his or her unique 
expression is materialized in the particular object that was shaped through 
touching. However, we believe that the intensity of physical contact is not a 
necessary condition to ensure agency control over the one-to-one 
materialized expression. Physical contact is simply one instantiation of 
ensuring agency control, and a common channel through which the creatRU¶V
expression can materialize in the symbolic object.  
To test this account, we ask subjects to determine the value of a 
sculpture made by an artist who had either high or little physical contact when 
shaping the object. These two conditions were adopted from past research 
conducted by Newman and Bloom (2012). Afterwards, we used our new 
relative valuation measure and asked subjects to compare the sculpture¶V
perceived value with the perceived value from an identical machine-made 
duplicate. We expect perceived value to decrease more for the duplicate 
made from the sculpture where the artist had high physical contact as 
compared to a duplicate made from a sculpture where he had low physical 
contact. The logic is as follows: The creator has no agency control over his 
materialized expression in the (identical) machine-made duplicate. So if the 
original high contact sculpture was valued higher because of agency control, 
then the perceived value for the duplicate made from this high contact original 
should also decrease more (compared to a duplicate made from a low contact 
original with limited agency control). However, this result would not yet 
provide sufficient evidence to support the agency control hypothesis, since the 
same result would be expected for the contagion effect. Namely, because a 
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machine-made duplicate by definition erases every contagion effect, 
perceived value for the duplicate made from a high contact original should 
also decrease more. We therefore introduce two further experimental 
conditions where agency control is additionally manipulated by writing that 
either high or low contact is needed to ensure a one-to-one materialization of 
WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ. It is possible that some subjects might doubt that low 
contact would allow the creator to (accurately) materialize his expression in 
the object. Hence, to make this claim credible, we wrote that the artist 
engaged LQDSURFHVVRIµPHQWDOVFXOSWLQJ,¶ZKHUHKHVKDSHVWKHHQWLUH
sculpture in his head without touching the clay. Afterwards, depending on the 
experimental condition, the artist needs either high or low contact with the 
REMHFWWRHQVXUHWKDWWKHµPHQWDOVFXOSWXUH¶LVUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKHREMHFt. In the 
low contact condition, low contact ensures agency control so that the mental 
image does not get lost as a result of too much time spent on the sculpture. 
Alternatively, in the high contact condition, high contact ensures that the 
mental sculpture is represented in the object, because he has sufficient time 
to transform the mental image into the object. Finally, perceived value is again 
PHDVXUHGE\DVNLQJVXEMHFWVWRFRPSDUHWKHVFXOSWXUH¶VSHUFHLYHGYDOXHZLWK
the perceived value from an identical machine-made duplicate. Since agency 
control is present in both of the latter two conditions (regardless of the amount 
of physical contact), perceived value should decrease equally for machine-
made duplicates. This result would be inconsistent with the contagion effect. 
This is because if the amount of physical contact is truly an independent 
factor, then perceived value should again decrease more for the duplicate 
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from the high contact original. At most, the agency control manipulation 
should add a main effect.  
To provide further evidence that our relative value measure is able to 
control for factors such as amount of effort or time spent on the project, we 
included another two conditions. These two conditions were identical to the 
first two conditions (where only high or low contact was manipulated), except 
that they did not include specific information about the amount of time the 
artist needed to complete the work. Because the amount of effort or time that 
is needed to complete the object should not affect our results, there should be 
no difference between conditions that did or did not have specific information 
about the amount of time that was needed to complete the work. 
Method 
Participants and design  
We recruited six hundred and sixty-six US adults (63% females; mean 
age = 37.58, SD = 13.02), through the same online panel as in the previous 
experiments participating in a series of unrelated studies in exchange for $1. 
To increase sample size and the likelihood that we would be able to recruit 
enough subjects, we collected the data in two waves of data collection. The 
results after the first wave did not differ from the results after including both 
waves. In a between-subjects full-factorial experimental design, we applied 
Newman and %ORRP¶VPDnipulation of contagion by describing whether 
the artist had a lot or little physical contact when crafting it.  
Participants read one of the following scenarios: 
Low amount of physical contact (low contagion) & No additional agency control 
manipulation 
A well-known artist was working on a modern clay sculpture. The particular process 
WKDWKHXVHGZDVYHU\³KDQGV-RII´²meaning, he used a lot of machinery and had 
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very little physical contact with the sculpture. The sculpture took him several days to 
complete.  
 
High amount of physical contact (high contagion) & No additional agency control 
manipulation 
A well-known artist was working on a modern clay sculpture. The particular process 
WKDWKHXVHGZDVYHU\³KDQGV-RQ´²meaning, he spent a long time physically 
touching the sculpture during the sculpting process. The sculpture took him several 
days to complete.  
 
Low amount of physical contact (low contagion) & Additional agency control 
manipulation 
A well-known artist was working on a modern clay sculpture. The process for such 
VFXOSWXUHLVYHU\³KDQGV-RQ´²meaning, the artist would spend a long time physically 
touching the sculpture during the sculpting process, because this allows an artist to 
develop and shape the unique artistic expression. However, this artist is known for a 
GLIIHUHQWDSSURDFK+HZRXOGVSHQGPDQ\GD\VRQ³PHQWDO-VFXOSWLQJ´ZKHUHKH
IRUPVWKHVFXOSWXUHLQKLVKHDGEXWZLWKRXWWRXFKLQJWKHFOD\7KHDUWLVWVWDWHV³0\
goal is to shape the sculpture until I can clearly see it in my head. This can take more 
than a week and involves an enormous amount of mental effort. But transforming the 
mental sculpture into clay has to be done with as minimal physical touching of the 
clay as possible. At most I spend half an hour on that, otherwise the physical 
VFXOSWXUHZRXOGEHGLIIHUHQWIURPWKHPHQWDORQH´ 
 
High amount of physical contact (high contagion) & Additional agency control 
manipulation 
A well-known artist was working on a modern clay sculpture. The process for such 
VFXOSWXUHLVYHU\³KDQGV-RQ´²meaning, the artist would spend a long time physically 
touching the sculpture during the sculpting process, because this allows an artist to 
develop and shape the unique artistic expression. However, this artist is known for a 
different approach. He would sSHQGPDQ\GD\VRQ³PHQWDO-VFXOSWLQJ´ZKHUHKHIRUPV
WKHVFXOSWXUHLQKLVKHDGEXWZLWKRXWWRXFKLQJWKHFOD\7KHDUWLVWVWDWHV³0\JRDOLV
to shape the sculpture until I can clearly see it in my head. This can take more than a 
week and involves an enormous amount of mental effort. But I spend even more time 
on transforming the mental sculpture into clay. This would require a very high amount 
of physically touching and forming the clay, otherwise the physical sculpture would be 
different from the mental onH´ 
 
The two conditions where the amount of time (that was needed to complete the 
object) was not mentioned were identical to the two conditions without an additional 
agency control manipulation, except that they did not contain the last sentence.  
 
Next, participants answered questions about perceived value. As 
explained above, we applied the relative valuation measure (compare 
perceived value between the original and its duplicate), which we adopted 
from Newman and Bloom (2012). We asked participants the following 
TXHVWLRQ³,IDPDFKLQHZRXOGPDNHDQH[DFWGXSOLFDWHIURPWKLVVFXOSWXUH
and the duplicate is identical in every way with the original (i.e., material, size, 
form and texture), how much would this machine-made duplicate be worth 
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FRPSDUHGWRWKHRULJLQDO"´ a lot less; 11 = a lot more; note that only for 
this measure we used a 1-11 scale; for the purposes of a more intuitive 
representation of the findings, we converted the scale to a -5 to 5 scale, 
where 0 represents equal perceived value between the original and the 
duplicate). A lower scale value means a larger decrease in perceived value of 
the duplicate in comparison to the original (i.e., on the converted scale, this 
means the further the mean value is below 0). 
For consistency and for control purposes, we also included the same 
direct measure of perceived value of the original sculpture, and a few other 
measures as we did for all the previous experiments (e.g., perceived effort, 
creativity, items from our previous mediation analyses, etc.). Details are 
reported in the online appendix.  
Results 
Consistent with our predictions, a 2 (contact: high vs. low) x 2 
(additional agency control manipulation: yes vs. no) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) on our perceived value measure (measured by the decrease in 
perceived valued of a machine-made duplicate compared to its hand-made 
original) revealed a significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 445) = 
39.95, p = .0001Ș2 = .07. As predicted (see Figure 42), perceived value of 
the duplicate decreased the most for additional agency control manipulation 
and high touch (M = -3.37, SE = .18, CI [-3.7, -3.0]), agency control 
manipulation and low touch (M = -3.20, SE = .18, CI [-3.5, -2.8]), and no 
agency control manipulation and high touch (M = -3.79, SE = .18, CI [-4.1, -
                                                        
2
 We would like to acknowledge the suggestions that reviewer one and two have provided us 
in order to improve the understandability of the representation of our findings for Experiments 
3, 4, and 5. Reviewer one suggested the re-coding of the scale and reviewer two suggested 
the label for the Y-axis. 
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3.4]). The lowest decrease in perceived value occurred for the duplicate in the 
no agency control manipulation and low touch condition (M = -1.31, SE = .18, 
CI [-1.6, -0.9]). There were significant main effects both for agency control 
manipulation, F(1, 445) = 16.08, p = .0001Ș2 = .03, and touch F(1, 445) = 
52.17, p  Ș2 = .09, which shows that both agency control manipulation 
as well as high physical contact affected perceived value across all conditions 
and independent from the other variable.  
Planned contrast tests provided further support for our predictions. The 
decrease in value for the duplicate in the no agency control manipulation/low 
touch condition was significantly muted as compared to all other conditions: 
Planned contrast tests between no agency control manipulation/low touch to 
no agency control manipulation/high touch were significant, t(448) = -9.65, p = 
.0001, d = 1.35. Planned contrast tests between no agency control 
manipulation/low touch and agency control manipulation/low touch were 
significant, t(448) = 7.32, p = .0001, d = .92. Planned contrast tests between 
no agency control manipulation/low touch and agency control 
manipulation/high touch was significant, t(448) = 7.95, p = .0001, d = 1.05. All 
other contrasts were not statistically significant.  
The ANOVAs with conditions where the amount of time (i.e., that was 
needed to complete the object) was not mentioned replicated the pattern of 
results in the previous findings. Details are reported in the online appendix. 
 
<Insert Figure 4> 
 
Discussion 
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Our relative valuation measure provides information about how much a 
machine-made duplicate decreases in perceived value compared to its 
original. For that purpose, ZHQHHGWRFRPSDUHHDFKFRQGLWLRQ¶VPHDQYDOXH
(e.g., -3.20 for the low contact and agency control condition) against 0 where 
the original and the duplicate are perceived to have equal value.  
As can be seen in Figure 4, the mean values of all four conditions 
where agency control was present (i.e., all conditions with high contact and 
the conditions where agency control was additionally manipulated) were 
significantly lower than the mean values of the two conditions without agency 
control. This is consistent with our proposed mechanism, because a core 
factor that underpins DQDUWREMHFW¶V;SHUFHLYHGYDOXHLVWKe perception that 
REMHFW;HPERGLHVWKHDUWLVW¶VXQLTXHH[SUHVVLRQZKLFKZDVPDGHGXULQJWKH
very moment of creation. If a machine just duplicates object X into object Y, 
both objects would represent the same moment of creation. This would go 
against the agency control hypotheses, which requires singular objects to be 
a one-to-one representation of singular moments of creation (to represent the 
FUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQFurthermore, our findings are inconsistent with the 
contagion effect. If the amount of physical contact itself would affect our 
mechanism of valuation, the perceived value would decrease more for all 
duplicates made from the high contact originals.  
We would like to address some limitations. One question could be 
whether RXUGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHµPHQWDOVFXOSWLQJ¶SURFHVVFRXOGPDNHSHRSOH
believe that the artist put in extra effort. But when comparing the results 
across all three high contact conditions (including those where the amount of 
working time was not mentioned), this seems to be implausible. Perceived 
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value was largely equal across these three conditions, despite the fact that in 
the conditions where the amount of working time was not mentioned, the artist 
should be perceived as putting in less effort because it did not include the 
information that he invested one entire week to complete this project. Another 
question could be whether our agency control manipulation was fully 
understood by our participants. First, the decrease in value indicates that the 
manipulation worked. Second, at the end of the survey, we had included 
some items about the understandability of our scenarios, and the mean 
response was 7.3 (on a scale of 1-9, with 9 indicating the highest level of 
understandability), which is the same mean that we have received for similar 
scenarios from other experiments and projects. There were also no significant 
differences in perceived understandability across the experimental conditions 
(likewise, there were no differences in perceived understandability across 
conditions in Experiments 4 and 5). This is consistent with the notion that 
participants had no problems in understanding our scenarios. In fact, we 
believe that such descriptions of art-production procedures are similar to what 
a layperson has typically read about contemporary art, because similar art-
projects are present in museums of modern art.  
The findings from Experiment 3 also show that our valuation 
mechanism is not affected by the form of production, specifically, whether the 
artistic expression is created directly on the object or whether the artist first 
engages in an imaginary design process (mental sculpting). Such factors 
influence our mechanism only when they affect the one-to-one materialization 
RIWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ, which was the case for the machine-made 
duplicates. In the final two studies, we examine situations when duplicates are 
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created by the artist himself or herself, and when 100% identical duplicates 
can be produced because the original was also produced by machine.  
Experiment 4: Decrease in Perceived Value of Duplicates in Art or Décor 
Objects 
In the previous experiment, we tested the hypotheses using our new 
relative valuation measure (by comparing originals with duplicates), that 
1HZPDQDQG%ORRP¶V contagion effect could be subsumed by our 
proposed mechanism. In Experiment 4, we will test our hypothesis that the 
mechanism of valuation does not depend on whether a person is familiar with 
the REMHFW¶VV\PEROLFPHDQLQJFurthermore, we will address the question of 
how perceived value is affected by the number of objects that are made. In 
particular, we will examine whether perceived value differs when there exists 
only one copy from an object, compared to when there exists more than one 
copy (e.g., a one of a kind art or décor object versus an entire series). 
For that purpose, we again applied our relative valuation measure by 
comparing perceived value between the first and second copy from an art-
object (salient symbolic object property) or from a décor-object (salient 
aesthetic object property). These second copies were either produced by the 
creator of the original, or by another person (a skilled craftsman).  
We predict that when the creator of the original makes a second copy, 
the decrease in perceived value of the second copy (compared to the first 
copy) should be largely identical, regardless of whether the original is an art- 
or a décor object. For the art object, this is because the second copy would 
represent another instance of a one-to-one materialization of the creator¶V 
expression (e.g., Rodin, who created several versions of The Thinker 
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sculpture ± see procedure 3 in Table 1, p. 10). For the décor object, the 
creator is expected to be familiar with the aesthetic rules that he or she had 
applied to the original, and should therefore be able to produce a second copy 
of largely identical quality. However, if another person makes a second copy 
from an art object, this second copy should have significantly lower perceived 
YDOXHEHFDXVHLWODFNVWKHFUHDWRU¶VRQH-to-one materialized expression (see 
procedure 1 in Table 1). This result would not change even though the second 
person has full information about the DUWZRUN¶VV\PEROLFPHDQLQJEHFDXVH
knowing the symbolic meaning cannot substitute the embodied expression of 
the creator. However, this is different when the object is a décor-object, and 
the second person is familiar with the aesthetic rule, which then could just be 
re-applied to the second copy.  
As argued above, the big advantage of measuring value by comparing 
objects is that it allows us to control for a variety of additional associations that 
might automatically become activated when measuring perceived value 
directly. For example, perceived value of a décor-object would most likely 
always be lower than the perceived value of an art-object. Subjects might 
judge art-objects to be more complex, more creative or because they believe 
WKDWµDUWLVVSHFLDO¶. But by comparing two objects, we can better control for 
these associations by solely focusing on factors that we expect to affect the 
differences in perceived value between object one and two.  
Consistent with this line of argumentation, we create a first baseline 
measure where we ask subjects to determine the change in perceived value 
of a second copy compared to a first copy, which was either an art object or a 
décor object. The creator of the first copy (henceforth the original) made both 
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of these second-copy objects and hence their perceived value should not 
differ substantially from their respective first copies. In another two 
experimental groups, we ask subjects to compare the same pairs of first- and 
second-copy objects. However, in these two conditions, the second copies 
were described as made by a craftsman who was not familiar with the art 
REMHFW¶VV\PEROLFPHDQLQJRUWKHapplied aesthetic rule for the décor object. 
Perceived value should decrease significantly for these two second-copy 
REMHFWVEHFDXVHWKHFUDIWVPDQFRXOGQRWVLPXODWHWKHFUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HG
experience. Additionally, the craftsman could not make a high-quality copy 
from a décor object if he or she is not familiar with the aesthetic rule. Finally, 
we had another two groups of first-second copy comparisons. For these two 
groups, a craftsman who was familiar with either the symbolic meaning or the 
aesthetic rule made the second copies. As described above, this should only 
mute the decrease in perceived value of the second copy of the décor object 
(because the craftsman can produce a better duplicate if he knows the rule). 
For the second copy from the art object, knowing the symbolic meaning will 
not mute the decrease in perceived value, because it still ODFNVWKHFUHDWRU¶V
agency control over the materialized expression.  
To enhance credibility on the notion that even an assistant could gain 
full knowledge over the symbolic meaning or the aesthetic rule, we told 
subjects that both were described in the form of a mathematical equation. 
This means that for every copy, the agent could always go back to this 
PDWKHPDWLFDOµVRXUFH-code,¶GHVFULELQJWKHV\PEROLFPHDQLQJRUWKHDHVWKHWLF
rule. Otherwise, if the source is another painting, one might expect the artist to 
be better at extracting the symbolic essence.  
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Method 
Participants and design  
We recruited six hundred and sixty-six US adults (62% females; mean 
age = 37.09, SD = 12.61), through the same online panel as in the previous 
experiments, who participated in a series of unrelated studies in exchange for 
$1. To increase sample size and the likelihood that we would be able to 
recruit enough subjects, we collected the data in two waves of data collection. 
The results after the first wave did not differ from the results after including 
both waves. In a between-subjects full-factorial experimental design, we 
described the first-copy object (canvas) as either having a decorative motif 
(i.e., aesthetic property) or an art motif (i.e., symbolic property representing 
WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ. Subjects then read that either the creator of the 
original or a skilled craftsman (who either did or did not have knowledge about 
the applied aesthetic rule or the symbolic meaning) made a second copy from 
the original. Across all conditions, we told participants that the original creator 
(artist) had first described the symbolic/artistic meaning/aesthetic solution into 
a mathematical equation, which he then transforms by hand-painting onto a 
canvas painting.  
Participants read one of the following scenarios: 
Art-object (symbolic object property) & Second copy made by creator of first copy.  
Mathematics and art have a long historical relationship. Esmaim M. is a famous 
contemporary mathematical artist. He develops his artistic expression into a 
mathematical equation and then paints it onto canvas. Typically, he would only make 
one painting out of every unique equation, but this time, he decides to paint a second 
one that looks 100% identical to the first one.  
 
Art-object (symbolic object property) & Second copy made by craftsman who knows 
symbolic meaning. 
Mathematics and art have a long historical relationship. Esmaim M. is a famous 
contemporary mathematical artist. He develops his artistic expression into a 
mathematical equation and then paints it onto canvas. Typically, he would only make 
one painting out of every unique equation, but this time, he decides to paint a second 
one that looks 100% identical to the first one. To ensure that the second painting is 
100% identical to the first one, he hires a highly skilled craftsman. He also makes 
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sure that the craftsman has perfect understanding of the symbolic meaning of every 
single element of the artwork when he paints it.  
 
Art-object (symbolic object property) & Second copy made by craftsman who does 
not know symbolic meaning. 
Mathematics and art have a long historical relationship. Esmaim M. is a famous 
contemporary mathematical artist. He develops his artistic expression into a 
mathematical equation and then paints it onto canvas. Typically, he would only make 
one painting out of every unique equation, but this time, he decides to make a second 
one from the same equation. To ensure that the second painting is 100% identical to 
the first one, he hires a highly skilled craftsman. The craftsman is not familiar with the 
symbolic meaning of the artwork. 
 
Décor-object (aesthetic object property) & Second copy made by creator of first copy. 
Mathematicians have for a long time tried to develop equations that describe and 
optimized principles of beauty and aesthetic. Such mathematical algorithms have 
been frequently applied to computer screen savers for example. Esmaim M. is a 
famous math scientist who specializes in the development of mathematical beauty 
algorithms. Besides that he is also a skilled motif-designer who would paint the 
DHVWKHWLFVROXWLRQWKDWKHGHULYHVIURPWKHDOJRULWKPRQWRFDQYDV+LVSDLQWLQJVGRQ¶W
have any artistic meaning, but are solely meant for decoration and nice and beautiful 
WRORRNDW7\SLFDOO\KHZRXOGRQO\PDNHRQHGHFRUDWLYHSDLQWLQJRXWRIHYHU\µEHDXW\-
HTXDWLRQ¶EXWWKLVWLPHKHGHFLGHVWRSDLQWDVHFRQGRQHZKLFKORRNVLGHQWLFDO
to the first one.  
 
Décor-object (aesthetic object property) & Second copy made by craftsman who 
knows aesthetic rule. 
Mathematicians have for a long time tried to develop equations that describe and 
optimized principles of beauty and aesthetic. Such mathematical algorithms have 
been frequently applied to computer screen savers for example. Esmaim M. is a 
famous math scientist who specializes in the development of mathematical beauty 
algorithms. Besides that he is also a skilled motif-designer who would paint the 
aesthetic soluWLRQWKDWKHGHULYHVIURPWKHDOJRULWKPRQWRFDQYDV+LVSDLQWLQJVGRQ¶W
have any artistic meaning, but are solely meant for decoration and nice and beautiful 
WRORRNDW7\SLFDOO\KHZRXOGRQO\PDNHRQHGHFRUDWLYHSDLQWLQJRXWRIHYHU\µEHDXW\-
HTXDWLRQ¶ but this time, he decides to paint a second one, which looks 100% identical 
to the first one. To ensure that the second painting is 100% identical to the first one, 
he hires a highly skilled craftsman. He also makes sure that the craftsman has 
perfect understanding of the mathematical principles behind the beauty equation. 
 
Décor-object (aesthetic object property) & Second copy made by craftsman who does 
not know aesthetic rule. 
Mathematicians have for a long time tried to develop equations that describe and 
optimized principles of beauty and aesthetic. Such mathematical algorithms have 
been frequently applied to computer screen savers for example. Esmaim M. is a 
famous math scientist who specializes in the development of mathematical beauty 
algorithms. Besides that he is also a skilled motif-designer who would paint the 
DHVWKHWLFVROXWLRQWKDWKHGHULYHVIURPWKHDOJRULWKPRQWRFDQYDV+LVSDLQWLQJVGRQ¶W
have any artistic meaning, but are solely meant for decoration and nice and beautiful 
to look at. TypicDOO\KHZRXOGRQO\PDNHRQHGHFRUDWLYHSDLQWLQJRXWRIHYHU\µEHDXW\-
HTXDWLRQ¶EXWWKLVWLPHKHGHFLGHVWRSDLQWDVHFRQGRQHZKLFKORRNVLGHQWLFDO
to the first one. To ensure that the second painting is 100% identical to the first one, 
he hires a highly skilled craftsman. The craftsman is not familiar with the 
mathematical principles behind the beauty equation. 
 
Next, participants answered WKHIROORZLQJTXHVWLRQ³&RPSDULQJWKH
VHFRQGFDQYDVZLWKWKHILUVWFDQYDVKRZPXFKLVWKHVHFRQGFDQYDVZRUWK"´
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(1 = a lot less than the first canvas; 9 = a lot more than the first canvas; for 
data analysis, we converted the scale into a -4 to 4 scale, where 0 represents 
equal perceived value between the original and the duplicate).  
Results and Discussion 
We ran a set of three separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs to examine the nature of 
the interactions between our variables (see Figure 5).  
First, we ran a 2 (type of object: art (symbolic) vs. décor (aesthetic)) x 2 
(second copy produced by: creator of the original vs. craftsman who does not 
know the rule) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on perceived value (measured 
by the decrease in perceived value of the second copy in comparison to the 
first copy), and the interaction between the two factors was not significant, 
F(1, 439) = 0.03, p  Ș2 = 0. There was a significant main effect on the 
person who produced the second copy F(1, 439) = 56.96, p  Ș2 = 
0.11. Consistent with our predictions, both creator-made copies decreased 
less in perceived value (second copy art-object: M = -0.18, SE = .12, CI [-
0.45, 0.09]; second copy decor-object: M = -0.23, SE = .13, CI [-1.7, -1.2]) 
than the craftsman-made copies (second copy art-object: M = -1.22, SE = .14, 
CI [-1.5, -1.0]; second copy decor-object: M = -1.31, SE = .14, CI [-1.6, -1.0]), 
and this is consistent with the account that only the creator of the first copy 
could re-apply the aesthetic rule, or perform another one-to-one materialized 
expression.  
It is also important to point out that the perceived value for both creator-
made second-copy objects had almost equal value compared to their first 
copies (0 represents identical value between the first and the second copy). 
This indicates that for our mechanism of valuation, it does not matter whether 
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there is only one of a kind or a series of objects or whether a certain copy is 
the first or the second. Also, we have strong evidence that our experimental 
procedure (i.e., measuring perceived value in relation to a comparison 
stimulus) was able to control for various other confounding variables, because 
there was no significant main effect on the object property variable. That is, 
the mean values between the second-copy art and the second copy décor 
objects were virtually identical, which is unlikely to happen when perceived 
value is measured in a direct way (e.g., ³What is your perceived value of the 
second copy painting"´).  
A 2 (type of object: art (symbolic) vs. décor (aesthetic)) x 2 (second 
copy produced by: creator of the original vs. craftsman who knows rule) 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on our perceived value measure revealed a 
significant interaction between the two factors, F(1, 440) = 6.73, p = .0098Ș2 
= .01 as well as a significant main effect on type of object property, F(1, 443) 
= 5.17, p  Ș2 = .01, and the type of person who produced the second 
copy F(1, 440) = 42.04, p  Ș2 = .09. Again, creator-made copies 
decreased less in value (second copy art-object: M = -0.18; second copy 
decor-object: M = -0.23) than the craftsman-made copies (second copy art-
object: M = -1.37, SE = .13, CI [-1.7, -1.2]; second copy decor-object: M = -
0.73, SE = .13, CI [-1.0, -0.5]). 
A planned contrasts analysis showed that the difference between both 
art and décor objects was not significant within the creator-made conditions 
t(440) = 0.22, p = .41, but this difference was significant within the craftsman 
conditions t(440) = -3.45, p = .0003, d = .41. Likewise, the decrease in 
perceived value was significantly less when the second copies were made by 
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the creator of the original objects compared to when they were made by the 
craftsman (for the second-copy décor objects: t(440) = 2.70, p = .0035, d = 
.37, and for the second-copy art objects: t(440) = 6.52, p = .0001, d = .84).  
These findings are again consistent with our hypothesis. Knowing the 
aesthetic rule would allow the craftsman to produce a better quality second 
copy (whose perceived value should decrease less), but knowing the 
symbolic meaning would not EHDEOHWRVXEVWLWXWHWKHFUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HG
expression in the second object, because the materialized expression needs 
WRFRQWDLQWKHFUHDWRU¶VPLQG. It is possible that the subjects felt that the décor-
originals would also contain a small symbolic element and which a craftsman 
therefore could not embody in the second copy. This could explain why the 
second copy décor object has lower perceived value when it was produced by 
the craftsman compared to one produced by the creator (designer) of the 
original.  
Finally, we ran a 2 (type of object: art (symbolic) vs. décor (aesthetic)) x 
2 (second-copy produced by: craftsman who knows the rule vs. craftsman 
who does not know the rule) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on our perceived 
value measure, and the interaction between the two factors was again 
significant, F(1, 441) = 5.20, p  Ș2 = .01, but there were no significant 
main effects. This finding is again consistent with our theoretical framework 
and follows the same argumentation as provided for the previous two 
ANOVAs. A planned contrast analysis confirmed that the decrease in 
perceived value for the second-copy décor-object was significantly less 
(t(441) = -2.57, p = .005, d = .41) when the craftsman knows the rule as 
compared to if he does not know the rule. It was also significantly less if he 
MIND IN THE OBJECT 
 
57 
knows the aesthetic rule compared to when he knows the rule for the art-
object (t(441) = -2.83, p = .002, d = .40). There were no other significant 
differences.  
 
<Insert Figure 5> 
 
Experiment 5: Valuation of a Fully Digitized Process of Materialization 
It is common knowledge that art objects represent symbolic meaning 
(e.g. Soda Can = critique on consumerism). But as we showed in the previous 
experiment, knowing the symbolic meaning would not allow another person to 
produce a higher valued second copy (i.e., a copy with a lower decreased 
value) from an original artwork, because the other person could not produce 
WKHFUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HGH[SUHVVLRQ This is why the copy produced by 
another person will be valued less than one made by the creator of the 
original. Likewise, second copy objects can have similar perceived value 
compared with the first copy when the artist produces both.  
It is a major challenge for every theory of symbolic object valuation to 
explain the value of modern artwork, particularly when they are made out of 
mass-manufactured products that cannot be physically shaped (e.g., a urinal). 
In Experiment 5, we show that our theoretical framework can also account for 
these types of symbolic objects. To understand how WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQ
is one-to-one materialized in objects of modern art (e.g., those made out of 
mass-manufactured products), we need to depict materialization as a concept 
that lies on a continuum. Materialization spans from rubbing oil-tinctured color 
particles onto canvas (painting), to making a collage picture from cut-out 
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newspaper images, to using 500 light bulbs to create a sculpture, to merely 
arranging, configuring, and hand-signing an existing mass-product. Hence, 
the one-to-RQHPDWHULDOL]DWLRQRIWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQLQWKHH[DPSOHRI
'XFKDPS¶VFountain occurs when the artist configures the hand-signed urinal 
upside-down, mounts it on a stand and displays it at an exhibition. It then 
became clear that Duchamp was not engaged in some plumbing work, but 
that he used this particular object arrangement to embody his artistic 
expression.  
To test our mechanism of valuation in the context of this particular 
category of symbolic objects we describe an entirely digitized process of 
object production where a painting called Wave Formations was fully drawn 
on computer and one original copy was printed onto canvas with a computer 
printer. The technological nature of the process allows the production of 
unlimited numbers of identical printouts, which is the same situation when 
modern artworks are made out of mass-manufactured products (e.g., one can 
buy hundreds of identical urinals). We again apply our relative valuation 
measure by asking subjects to rate the perceived value of a second copy in 
comparison to the first copy (i.e., the original). Following the logic of our 
theoretical framework, we expect the value of the second copy to be 
significantly below the value of the first copy because only the first copy object 
UHSUHVHQWVWKHFUHDWRU¶VRQH-to-one materialized expression (which occurred 
in the moment it was first printed out). Instead, the second copy is just an 
identical machine-made copy of the first copy (if Duchamp bought another 
urinal from the store). In another condition, we apply the same value measure 
to a second-copy object, which the artist draws by hand (based on the printed 
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original). Perceived value for this hand-drawn duplicate should be close to the 
(printed) first copy, because then it represents another unique instance of the 
FUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HGH[SUHVVLRQas if Duchamp made a Fountain painting). 
Finally, we replicate both conditions, but this time, the second-copy objects 
were produced by an assistant (again either printed out or drawn by hand). As 
discussed in Experiment 4, a hand-drawn copy made by an assistant should 
be valued significantly less compared to its (printed) original as well as 
compared to a hand-drawn copy made by the creator of the (printed) original 
(compare procedure 1 vs. 3 in Table 1, p.10). However, when a second copy 
object is printed out, it should not affect perceived value whether the assistant 
or the artist made it, because pushing the print button would not affect the 
FUHDWRU¶VPDWHULDOL]HGH[SUHVVLRQ 
To control for the fact that the difference between artist- and assistant 
made hand-drawn duplicates is not attributable to the fact that one expects 
the artist to perform a more exact representation of the symbolic motif, we 
also manipulated the complexity of the motif, as well as the exactness of the 
representation of the motif. Both the motif-complexity and exactness of the 
representation should not affect our proposed valuation mechanism.  
Method 
Participants and design  
We recruited six hundred and sixty-three US adults (62% females; 
mean age = 37.09, SD = 12.61) through the same online panel as in the 
previous experiments, who participated in a series of unrelated studies in 
exchange for $1. To increase sample size and the likelihood that we would be 
able to recruit enough subjects, we collected the data in two waves of data 
MIND IN THE OBJECT 
 
60 
collection. The results after the first wave did not differ from the results after 
including both waves. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
conditions in a 2 (producer of the duplicate (i.e., second copies): artist or 
assistant) X 4 (form of production: print vs. hand complex motif vs. hand 
simple motif vs. hand with deviance) between-subjects full-factorial 
experimental design.  
Participants read one of the following scenarios: 
Artist produces duplicate & Print (duplicate is printed). 
Svena I. is a world-renowned Swedish painter who draws all her paintings purely on 
computer, but without ever allowing any software to modify or change what she has 
drawn. One of her paintings, called Wave Formations, has a very complex geometric 
motif (see picture above). The artist was inspired for this painting by wave formations 
she saw on a recent trip through the Australian Torrent Sea. It was drawn entirely on 
computer and then printed onto canvas. There exists only one copy from Wave 
Formations and it is valued at $100,000. However, the artist agrees to make an exact 
duplicate, so she re-prints another copy of Wave Formations. The duplicate looks 
identical in every way. 
 
Artist produces duplicate & Hand complex motif (duplicate is hand-drawn). 
Svena I. is a world-renowned Swedish painter who draws all her paintings purely on 
computer, but without ever allowing any software to modify or change what she has 
drawn. One of her paintings, called Wave Formations, has a very complex geometric 
motif (see picture above). The artist was inspired for this painting by wave formations 
she saw on a recent trip through the Australian Torrent Sea. It was drawn entirely on 
computer and then printed onto canvas. There exists only one copy from Wave 
Formations and it is valued at $100,000. However, the artist agrees to make an exact 
duplicate, so she hand-draws a second Wave Formations painting.  
 
Artist produces duplicate & Hand deviate (duplicate is hand-drawn and shows slight 
deviation from the original). 
Svena I. is a world-renowned Swedish painter who draws all her paintings purely on 
computer, but without ever allowing any software to modify or change what she has 
drawn. One of her paintings, called Wave Formations, has a very complex geometric 
motif (see picture above). The artist was inspired for this painting by wave formations 
she saw on a recent trip through the Australian Torrent Sea. It was drawn entirely on 
computer and then printed onto canvas. There exists only one copy from Wave 
Formations and it is valued at $100,000. However, the artist agrees to make a 
duplicate, so she hand-draws a second Wave Formations painting. This duplicate is 
extremely similar in every way, but experts would notice some very slight deviation 
from the first painting.  
 
Assistant produces duplicate & Print (duplicate is printed). 
Svena I. is a world-renowned Swedish painter who draws all her paintings purely on 
computer, but without ever allowing any software to modify or change what she has 
drawn. One of her paintings, called Wave Formations, has a very complex geometric 
motif (see picture above). The artist was inspired for this painting by wave formations 
she saw on a recent trip through the Australian Torrent Sea. It was drawn entirely on 
computer and then printed onto canvas. There exists only one copy from Wave 
Formations and it is valued at $100,000. However, the artist agrees to make an exact 
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duplicate, so she asks an assistant to re-print another copy of Wave Formations. The 
duplicate looks identical in every way. 
 
Assistant produces duplicate & Hand complex motif (duplicate is hand-drawn). 
Svena I. is a world-renowned Swedish painter who draws all her paintings purely on 
computer, but without ever allowing any software to modify or change what she has 
drawn. One of her paintings, called Wave Formations, has a very complex geometric 
motif (see picture above). The artist was inspired for this painting by wave formations 
she saw on a recent trip through the Australian Torrent Sea. It was drawn entirely on 
computer and then printed onto canvas. There exists only one copy from Wave 
Formations and it is valued at $100,000. However, the artist agrees to make an exact 
duplicate, so she asks an assistant to hand-draw a second Wave Formations 
painting.  
 
Assistant produces duplicate & Hand deviate (duplicate is hand-drawn and shows 
slight deviation from the original). 
Svena I. is a world-renowned Swedish painter who draws all her paintings purely on 
computer, but without ever allowing any software to modify or change what she has 
drawn. One of her paintings, called Wave Formations, has a very complex geometric 
motif (see picture above). The artist was inspired for this painting by wave formations 
she saw on a recent trip through the Australian Torrent Sea. It was drawn entirely on 
computer and then printed onto canvas. There exists only one copy from Wave 
Formations and it is valued at $100,000. However, the artist agrees to make an exact 
duplicate, so she so she asks an assistant to hand-draw a second Wave Formations 
painting. This duplicate is extremely similar in every way, but experts would notice 
some very slight deviation from the first painting.  
 
 
The simple motif conditions (for both the Artist and Assistant duplicates) had the 
same text than for the complex motif (except for describing it as a simple motif), but 
displayed a different (=simpler) geometric art motif. 
 
Next, participants answered the following question to indicate 
SHUFHLYHGYDOXH³How much should the value of the duplicate painting be"´
= a lot less than $100,000; 9 = a lot more than $100,000; for data analysis, we 
converted this scale into a -4 to 4 scale, where 0 represents equal perceived 
value between the duplicate and the original).  
Results and Discussion 
We ran a set of several separate 2 X 2 ANOVAs to examine the nature 
of the interactions between our variables. Across all hand-drawn conditions 
(Figure 6), compared to their respective originals, the artist-made duplicates 
decreased less in value (complex motif: M = -0.64, SE = .20, CI [-1.1, -0.3]; 
simple motif: M = -1.1, SE = .20, CI [-1.6, -0.7]; complex motif with slight 
deviation from original: M = -0.8, SE = .20, CI [-1.3, -0.4]) than assistant-made 
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duplicates (complex motif: M = -2.2, SE = .20, CI [-2.7, -1.8]; simple motif: M = 
-2.44, SE = .20, CI [-2.9, -2.1]; complex motif with slight deviation from 
original: M = -2.21, SE = .21, CI [-2.7, -1.8]). There was no significant 
difference whether the printed duplicate was made by the artist (M = -1.75, SE 
= .21, CI [-2.2, -1.4]) or by the assistant (M = -1.67, SE = .20, CI [-2.1, -1.3]). 
A 2 (producer of the duplicate: artist or assistant) X 2 (form of 
production: print vs. hand complex motif) analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
our perceived value measure revealed a significant interaction between the 
two factors, F(1, 332) = 16.11, p = .0001Ș2 = .04 as well as a significant main 
effect on the person who produced the duplicate F(1, 332) = 13.32, p = .0003, 
Ș2 = .04. A planned contrasts analysis showed the artist-made printed 
duplicate decreased more in perceived value than the artist-made hand-drawn 
duplicate (t(332) = -3.81, p = .0002, d = .59), but the assistant-made printed 
duplicate decreased less in perceived value than the assistant-made hand-
drawn duplicate (t(332) = 1.85, p = .03, d = .28). The artist-produced hand-
drawn duplicate decreased less in perceived value than the assistant-
produced (t(332) = 5.46, p = .0001, d = .82), but there was no difference 
between the printed duplicates.  
The ANOVA on 2(producer of the duplicate: artist or assistant) X 2(form 
of production: print vs. hand simple motif) replicated the previous findings 
(F(1, 327) = 11.76, p  Ș2 = .03 for the interaction and (F(1, 327) = 
9.43, p  Ș2 = .03 for the main effect) and so did the ANOVA on 
2(producer of the duplicate: artist or assistant) X 2(form of production: print vs. 
hand deviate from original), (F(1, 322) = 12.76, p  Ș2 = .03 for the 
interaction and (F(1, 322) = 10.34, p  Ș2 = .03 for the main effect). 
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Planned contrasts for both ANOVAs showed the same pattern as the one 
described above with the complex motif. Other ANOVAs of interest [2(artist 
vs. assistant) X 2(hand-complex vs. hand-simple); 2(artist vs. assistant) X 
2(hand-complex vs. hand-deviate); 2(artist vs. assistant) X 2 (hand-simple vs. 
hand-deviate)] showed only main effects (ps < .0001) on the producer of the 
duplicate variable.   
 
<Insert Figure 6> 
 
The results, in our opinion, provide the strongest test for our main 
account, namely that valuation as a function of the one-to-one materialization 
RIWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQDOVRRFFXUVLQsymbolic objects, which could be 
identically reproduced in unlimited numbers (e.g., mass-products used for 
works of modern art). The mechanism can best be understood when looking 
at the finding that perceived value had decreased more when the artist made 
the print-duplicate compared to when she made the duplicate by hand. First of 
all, the results indicate that the print duplicates were not perceived as simple 
printouts from a low quality artwork, because then their perceived value 
should be closer to 0 (i.e., we would expect the original and the duplicate of a 
low quality artwork to have similar perceived value). Instead, the print-
duplicates had substantially lower perceived value than their originals, which 
confirms what we had explained with objects of modern art such as 
'XFKDPS¶VXULQDO7KDWLVXULQDOVDUHPDVV-manufactured products which 
could be purchased in unlimited numbers, and the same applies to fully 
digitized motifs from which one could print out copies in any desired number 
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(with identical quality). But in the same way that 'XFKDPS¶V urinal was 
arranged to become a piece of art (i.e., Fountain), our original print-out (in the 
context it was described) became a piece of art with the intention to embody 
WKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQThat is, the artist first digitally represented his or her 
expression by drawing a visual motif and then this became one-to-one 
embodied in the original printout (i.e., it became an end-statement). Hence, a 
second printout would be of lower perceived value, because it is simply a 
machine-PDGHFRS\IURPWKHDUWLVW¶VPDWHULDOHQG-statement (created in the 
moment it was first printed out). Of equal interest is the finding that the 
decrease in perceived value was the same for the assistant-made print-
duplicate. Since both the artist- and assistant-made print duplicates do not 
UHSUHVHQWWKHFUHDWRU¶VH[SUHVVLRQthe person who produced these duplicates 
should not affect their perceived value. This means that when the 
technological procedure allows for unlimited and identical duplication (as is 
the case with buying urinals or printing unlimited copies), the perceiver needs 
to understand that an object was made with the intention to represent the 
FUHDWRU¶VRQH-to-one materialized expression. Such information would 
naturally be present when the artist made a hand-duplicate, because then it 
would be perceived as another version of Wave Formations (like a painting 
made from 'XFKDPS¶VFountain sculpture). Another option would be when the 
artist draws a second symbolic motif and prints it out.  
As expected, in the hand-made conditions, the assistant-made 
duplicates had lower perceived value compared to the artist-made duplicates. 
Of particular interest here are the findings that the difference between artist- 
and assistant-made duplicates was largely identical across all hand-made 
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conditions. This shows that valuation in the context of our framework does not 
depend on how accurate the symbolic motif is transformed into the object.  
It is also important to point out that our results could not be explained 
by uniqueness, because the assistant-made hand-drawn duplicates were also 
unique. Additionally, the fact that we did not find any difference between the 
simple and the complex motifs would go strongly against creativity as a 
possible driver of valuation. Even though we did not measure perceived level 
of creativity, the simple motif appears almost trivial as compared to the 
complex motif (see pictures of our motif stimuli in the online appendix) and 
would most likely be rated as much less creative. Finally, the findings would 
also contradict the contagion hypothesis because the artist-made hand-drawn 
copies had lower perceived value than the assistant-made hand-drawn 
duplicates.  
Our findings appear to provide converging evidence that in the context 
of our theoretical framework, valuation does not depend on whether an object 
is made by the artist or an assistant or whether it is labeled as first or second 
copy or as a duplicate. It also does not depend on how accurate the symbolic 
motif has been transformed into the material object, and whether the object 
was produced through traditional hand-production or through modern digital 
technology. Instead, the production procedure affects our mechanism of 
valuation when it allows the creator to have agency control over the one-to-
one materialized expression in the object.  
General Discussion 
We began this manuscript by describing the observation that in most 
cultures and markets, hand-made objects have higher perceived value even 
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though their functional performance might be inferior to ones made by 
machines. We then argued that this can be explained by one underlying driver 
for symbolic material object valuation: The one-to-one materialization of the 
FUHDWRU¶VXQLTXHSHUVRQDOH[SUHVVLRQin the particular object. And we further 
argued that this form of isomorphic transformation of the act of creation into a 
singular object can explain why many of our most valuable material objects 
share phenomenological characteristics, such as being hand-made, being an 
original, and that their motifs have been designed by human beings rather 
than made by a computer algorithms or machines.  
Furthermore, we specified that our proposed mechanism consists of 
WZRPDLQIDFWRUVWKHVDOLHQFHRIWKHREMHFW¶VV\PEROLFobject property, and 
(2) the perception of agency control over the FUHDWRU¶VRQH-to-one materialized 
expression. We empirically tested this in a series of six experimental studies. 
Experiments 1a and 1b demonstrated that the perception of one-to-one 
materialization was hampered once there is some intervention (i.e., 
standardization of the result) that affected the final version of the materialized 
expression. These experiments also showed that such intervention would not 
affect valuation when the object is not symbolic, but had mainly functional or 
aesthetic quality. A mediation analysis confirmed that this process of symbolic 
object valuation was driven by the perception of the FUHDWRU¶Vexpression. 
Experiment 2 provides further insights into the mechanism by manipulating 
the source of the human and symbolic expression (i.e., artist versus 
algorithm). In Experiments 3 and 4 it was shown that the process of 
materialized expression could not be explained by a contagion effect. It was 
also shown that our mechanism of valuation is LQGHSHQGHQWIURPWKHREMHFW¶V
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symbolic meaning or how much the agent knows about the symbolic meaning. 
Experiment 5 provides specific insights into how our mechanism applies to 
modern artworks, and to processes that allow unlimited production of identical 
duplicates. 
Alternative Explanations and Limitations 
Although the above listed phenomena are readily observable in the real 
world, the mechanism is not immediately intuitive and has not been theorized 
by past psychological research. Typically, past research has treated such 
phenomena of valuation separately, offering a variety of explanations such as 
perceived uniqueness (e.g., Tian et al. , 2001; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980), 
aesthetic appeal (e.g., Augustin, Leder, Hutzler, & Carbon, 2008; 
Ramachandran, 2001; Reber et al., 2004), creativity (e.g. Newman & Bloom, 
2012), effort  (e.g., Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven & Altermatt, 2004), scarcity (e.g. 
Verhallen, 1982; Verhallen & Robben, 1994; Lynn, 1991) or the amount of 
physical contact (Newman & Bloom, 2012; Newman et al., 2011). We argue 
that these factors could not account for the entire series of results presented 
in our six experimental studies. More specifically, across many of our 
conditions, we kept factors such as effort or physical contact constant. For 
example, in Experiments 1a, 1b and 2, the objects had the same amount of 
physical contact from the creator. Experiment 3 specifically addressed that 
physical contact is just one way of ensuring WKHFUHDWRU¶VHJ, DUWLVW¶Vone-to-
one materialized expression. We also consider it as implausible that it would 
require more effort to create a symbolic object as compared to a functional or 
aesthetic object. Several of our experiments showed that the difference 
cannot be attributed to the level of aesthetic appeal (cf. Exp
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and 5) because perceived appeal by definition cannot differ as a function of 
whether it is perceived from an original or perceived from an identical 
duplicate. Furthermore, we do not believe that the difference between 
symbolic and non-symbolic (or art versus non-art) objects would depend on 
the level of creativity or creative performance (Newman & Bloom, 2012). It 
involves a much higher level of creativity when making an original as 
compared to a duplicate. However, it is not likely that making a series of 
mouth-blown wine glasses or a painting would necessarily require a higher 
level of creativity than inventing a highly innovative technological object such 
as a well-functioning stone axe, the first plough, or modern high-tech devices. 
Consistent with our results, we argue that the underlying driver of value here 
is about WKHFUHDWRU¶VXQLTXHexpression and not creativity, though the former 
would also involve the latter. Finally, we also do not think that our results 
could be explained by perceived uniqueness or scarcity, or that very complex 
and creative shapes would be more difficult to reproduce. In some of our 
experiments (1a, b, 2), we have measured perceived scarcity and including 
this factor into our statistical analyses did not affect our results. In Experiment 
1b, we manipulated three object properties (functional, aesthetic, symbolic), 
only in the symbolic quality condition was perceived value affected by agency 
control. In Experiment 2, we showed that unique objects would have less 
value when they do not contain a human expression because they were made 
by a computer algorithm. More specifically, Experiments 4 and 5 are 
inconsistent with the alternative explanations of scarcity or problems with 
reproducibility of complex and creative motifs. In these experiments, we had 
shapes with varying degrees of complexity across all conditions. Above all, if 
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duplicates from symbolic objects would decrease more in perceived value 
because they are harder to reproduce, then we should have seen a difference 
between the magnitude of decreases in perceived value of creator-made 
aesthetic and symbolic object duplicates. Likewise, these experiments also 
ruled out the lay-theoretic explanation that objects of art would be perceived 
as inheriting a certain µaura¶ or spirit via the fact they were either labeled as art 
or made by an artist who is perceived as a human being with special abilities. 
Again, one might be tempted to label art objects or hand-made originals as 
PRUHµXQLTXH¶%XWDVZHH[SODLQHGLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQWKLVIRUPRI
µXQLTXHQHVV¶is inconsistent with psychological theories of uniqueness, which 
have their application in the context of group and social identities. For 
example, if I am surrounded by people with green T-shirts, I should be better 
able to satisfy my need for uniqueness by wearing a machine-made red T-
shirt than with a hand-made green T-shirt. We leave it to future research to 
connect our theoretical mechanism with a novel FRQVWUXFWRIµhuman 
XQLTXHQHVV¶   
Regarding the experimental stimuli, we used descriptions of objects 
(with accompanying visual images) rather than the object itself.  There are 
several reasons why we think this does not pose serious problems for testing 
our story.  First, even real-OLIHDXFWLRQVDW6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶VXVH
descriptions of the objects, and, just like our stimulus materials, are 
accompanied by the visual images. So our experiments are ecologically valid 
with regards to the valuation processes that actually occur at auction houses 
VXFKDV6RWKHE\¶VDQG&KULVWLH¶V6HFRQGRXUJRDOLVWRPHDVXUHWKH
SDUWLFLSDQW¶VSHUFHLYHGYDOXHRIWKHREMHFWUDWKHUWKDQWKHLUSXUFKDVH
MIND IN THE OBJECT 
 
70 
intention, because our participants have average incomes and modest 
budgets, making it difficult for them to generate a real purchase intention for 
expensive items such as art and sculpture.  
Overall, we believe that our empirical studies provide solid evidence 
that our proposed theoretical framework of valuation constitutes a universal 
and core mechanism to help us understand the process of valuation for a 
major class of symbolic material objects. We have also demonstrated the 
universal applicability of this mechanism by empirically testing it in the context 
of various possible forms of symbolic object production (i.e., one or many 
motifs onto one or many objects, produced by hand or machine; produced by 
the creator of the original or another person). Related to that, we also outlined 
how the mechanism of valuation relates to objects of modern art or forms of 
digital production. 
Conclusion 
One of our intentions was to suggest that psychological valuation for 
material objects such as art and symbolic artifacts comes from a core 
psychological mechanism that is based RQRXUVSHFLHV¶XQLTXHUHODWLRQVKLS
with material objects. In this sense, material art objects do in fact differ from 
other forms of arts such as the performing arts (music, dance, theatre) or 
literature. Our proposed mechanism only applies to the former because, by 
definition, it requires a material object. Even though pieces of performing arts 
could be described in a material object (e.g., the musical score written down 
by the composer), WKLVGHVFULSWLRQGRHVQRWFRQWDLQWKHFUHDWRU¶V(one-to-one) 
expression, which only occurs in the moment when this person performs the 
expression in real time on stage. So although paintings would constitute 
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material end-statements, this is not possible with a musical performance, 
because by definition, it only occurs in the transient moment of the 
performance. The musical score is therefore something similar to the 
mathematical equation containing the symbolic meaning that we used for 
Experiment 4. Indeed, if the artist had purposely stopped at this point, then 
every person could use the equation and transform it into his/her very 
individual material end-statements, because the creator never produced a 
materialized original. Although these symbolic objects made by end-
consumers ZRXOGQRWFRQWDLQWKHDUWLVW¶VRQH-to-one materialized expression, 
it would be the end-FRQVXPHU¶VPDWHULDOL]HGH[SUHVVLRQNote that recording a 
musical performance on a CD would not fall into this category, because it 
would only be a recorded observation of a particular performance (just like 
video-taping an artist who draws a painting).  
A potential direction for future research would be to examine 
differences between symbolic material objects that have mainly idiosyncratic 
value (e.g., P\ILUVWERUQ¶VGUDZLQJDQGWKRVHWKDWKDYHYDOXHIRUWKHHQWLUH
humanity (e.g., Lascaux cave paintings, Sistine chapel frescos). Furthermore, 
it would be interesting to look into the mechanism that determines how 
symbolic material objects maintain their value over time. Whereas the value 
for functional objects would depend on whether they maintain their function, 
making it difficult for functional objects to retain their value over long periods 
of time, the value of symbolic objects is not only sustained over time, it might 
even increase significantly. Another interesting direction for future research 
might be to further examine psychological (valuation) processes of creator-
made duplicates. For example, are duplicates made by the creator considered 
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as completely different instances of expression, or do they constitute revivals 
or reinterpretations of past experiences?  
In 1976, the American philosopher Nelson Goodman explained in his 
book Languages of Art that art is a system of symbols that refer to a core of 
representations, yet the symbols do not possess these representations. 
Considered one of the most important works of 20th century aesthetics, 
*RRGPDQ¶VZRUNVHWVWKHSKLORVRSKLFDOIRXQGDWLRQIRUWKHresearch that we 
presented here. Yet, our suggested mechanism goes beyond valuation that 
results from purely idiosyncratic processes, or mainly singular objects such as 
works of art. By identifying the relationships between two core factors 
(symbolic object property and the FUHDWRU¶V materialized expression), we 
provide a first attempt at identifying the universal psychological mechanisms 
for explaining judgments of value for perhaps the most uniquely human 
category of symbolic material objects, and we hope this sheds insight into one 
of the most fundamental psychological processes of our human species. 
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Table 
 
Procedure 1 
One clay-YHUVLRQUHSUHVHQWVWKHFUHDWRU¶Vmaterialized expression (e1), which is later 
transformed by machine or another person into three marble blocks X, Y, Z. 
The machine or the other person transforms e1 into three different marble blocks: Xe1, 
Ye1, Ze1 
Procedure 2  
Three clay-YHUVLRQVUHSUHVHQWWKHFUHDWRU¶VWKUHHmaterialized expressions (e1, e2, e3), 
which are later transformed by machine or another person into three marble blocks X, Y, 
Z. 
The machine or the other person assists in transforming e1, e2, e3 into three different 
marble blocks: Xe1, Ye2, Ze3 LHWKUHHµHQG-VWDWHPHQWV¶ 
Procedure 3  
One clay-YHUVLRQVHUYHVDVDSURWRW\SHIRUWKHFUHDWRU¶Vexpression (e), which provides an 
orientation for the three materialized expressions (e1, e2, e3) that are created and 
materialized during the moment of shaping the three marble blocks X, Y, Z.  
Again they become three material end-statements: Xe1, Ye2, Ze3 
Explanation: Procedures 2 and 3 show how our mechanism of agency control applies to 
these most common forms of art or symbolic artifact creation (especially when the creator 
makes an entire series). Through procedure 2 the creator creates three materialized 
H[SUHVVLRQVLQFOD\LHWKUHHPDWHULDOµHQG-VWDWHPHQWV¶0DFKLQHVRURWKHUSHRSOHPHUHO\
assist during production. Through procedure 3 the creator creates three different 
materialized expressions during the shaping of the three marble blocks.  
 
Table 1. Agency control over the one-to-one materialized expression applied to common 
procedures (2 and 3) of art and symbolic artifact production/creation.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Mean perceived value in Experiment 1a as a function of type of object property 
(functional (durability)/symbolic (shape)) and agency control over the transformation 
(preserve or remove variance). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 2. Mean perceived value in Experiment 1b as a function of type of object property 
(functional (accuracy)/symbolic (symbol)/aesthetic) and agency control over the 
transformation (preserve or remove variance). Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 3. Mean perceived value in Experiment 2 as a function of form of production 
(designer/algorithm) and uniqueness. Error bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 4. Comparative perceived value on a scale of -5 (duplicate values a lot less than 
original), to 5 (duplicate values a lot more than original), whereby 0 represents equal 
perceived value between duplicate and original. Length of the bars indicates the decrease in 
perceived value of a duplicate compared to its respective original as a function of agency 
control (either additionally manipulated or because of a level of psychological contagion). 
Error bars represent standard errors.  
  
MIND IN THE OBJECT 
 
82 
 
 
Figure 5. Comparative perceived value on a scale of -4 (second copy values a lot less than 
first copy), to 4 (second copy values a lot more than first copy), whereby 0 represents equal 
perceived value between both copies. Length of the bars indicates the decrease in perceived 
value of a second copy compared to its respective first copy as a function of type of object 
(art vs. decor) and second copy produced by (the creator of the original; a craftsman who 
knows the rule; and a craftsman who does not know the rule for the art/décor motif). Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
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Figure 6. Comparative perceived value on a scale of -4 (duplicate values a lot less than 
original), to 4 (duplicate values a lot more than original), whereby 0 represents equal 
perceived value between duplicate and original. Length of the bars indicates the decrease in 
perceived value of a duplicate compared to its respective original as a function of the person 
who produced the duplicate (artist vs. assistant) and the form of production (print; hand-drawn 
complex motif; hand-drawn simple motif; hand-drawn (deviates slightly from original)). Error 
bars represent standard errors. 
 
